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I.

INTRODUCTION

A day after terrorists hijacked four passenger planes and crashed them
into the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, killing

nearly 3,000 people, President George W. Bush demanded of Attorney
General John Ashcroft, CIA Director George Tenet, and FBI Director Robert

Mueller, "Don't ever let this happen again."I
Responding to the President's directive, Ashcroft, Tenet, Mueller, and
other high-level executive branch leaders embarked on a wide variety of
counterterrorism actions, including criminal investigations and prosecutions,
immigration enforcement, military attacks in multiple Middle Eastern
countries, and imposition of broad surveillance programs inside the United
States. 2 President Bush's approval rating in the immediate aftermath of 9/11
skyrocketed to among the highest in Gallup history, but that popularity-and
"widespread public support for a war against terrorism"3-soon faded. One
indication of the drop in support is that in 2004, Michael Moore's Fahrenheit

1.
See GARRETT M. GRAFF, THE THREAT MATRIX: THE FBI AT WAR IN THE AGE OF
GLOBAL TERROR 395 (2011); JOHN ASHCROFT, NEVER AGAIN: SECURING AMERICA AND
RESTORING JUSTICE 130 (2006).
2.
See ASHCROFT, supra note 1, at 131-42; Structural Changes to Enhance Counter-

Terrorism Efforts, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. ARCHIVES, https://www.justice.gov/archive/911
/counterterrorism.html [https://penna.cc/E65L-N7R4].
3.
David W. Moore, Bush Job Approval Highest in Gallup History: Widespread Public
Supportfor War on Terrorism, GALLUP (Sept. 24, 2001), https://news.gallup.com/poll/4924/
bush-job-approval-highest-gallup-history.aspx [https://perma.cc/YDW5-QWAR].
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9/11, a scathing denunciation of the Bush Administration's post-9/11 policies,
"becam[e] the highest grossing documentary of all time." 4

Much of the academic and political criticism of the Bush
Administration's counterterrorism strategy centered on the perceived
illegality of the "global war on terrorism." 5 One common argument was that
a non-state group could not be the target of military force, only law
enforcement efforts, and therefore the military attacks against al Qaeda were
unlawful. 6 Secondary lines of criticism focused on the methods the United
States used to wage war against al Qaeda, such as the indefinite detention of
captured fighters at the naval base on Guantanamo Bay,7 and the use of armed
drones to attack suspected terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan and
elsewhere, particularly where the targets were American citizens.8 The
domestic actions were no less controversial. The warrantless electronic
surveillance of Americans' e-mails and telephone calls triggered Fourth
Amendment objections, 9 while the criminal terrorism prosecutions drew
protests of entrapment.'

0

This Article starts from the premise that terrorism is a form of asymmetric
warfare and counterterrorism accordingly has elements in common with
counterinsurgency. This is, to be sure, not a novel premise;" among other

things, it was a crucial implication of President Bush's rhetoric of a "war
against terrorism."1 2 The most obvious analogical comparison of the U.S.

4.
Owen Gleiberman, How Michael Moore Lost His Audience, VARIETY
(Sept. 23, 2018), https://variety.com/2018/film/columns/how-michael-moore-lost-his-audiencefahrenheit-11-9-1202953813/ [https://perna.cc/U7T6-Y3NA].
5.
See, e.g., President George W. Bush, 9/11 Address to the Nation (Sept. 11, 2001)
(audio and transcript available at https://americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush9l1
addresstothenation.htm) [https://penna.cc/YYG9-GZGC].
6.
See, e.g., Tung Yin, Broken Promises or UnrealisticExpectations?: Comparing the
Bush andObama Administrationson Counterterrorism,20 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMPORARY

PROBS. 465, 475 (2011).
7.
See, e.g., Oona Hathaway et al., The Power to Detain: Detention of Terrorism
SuspectsAfter 9/11, 38 YALE INT'L L.J. 123 (2013).
8.
See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010); but see Alberto R.
Gonzales, Drones: The Power to Kill, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (2013) (defending the legality
of the drone strike that killed Anwar al-Aulaqi).
9.
See infra Section IV.C.
10. See infra Section IV.D.
11.

See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, The Social Productionof NationalSecurity, 98 CORNELL L.

REV. 637, 664 (2013); Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARv. NAT'L
SECURITY J. 147, 148 (2014); Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and
Strategy of Counter-Radicalization,64 STAN. L. REV. 125, 137 (2012).
12. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address to a Joint Session of
Congress and the American People (Sept. 21, 2001) (transcript available at
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response to 9/11 to traditional warfare are the attacks launched against al
Qaeda and the Taliban pursuant to the November 17, 2001, Authorization to

Use Military Force (AUMF),1 3 with the AUMF being the functional
equivalent of a declaration of war. 14
The most obvious implication of counterterrorism as warfare is the legal
ability to use military force to capture or kill the targets of the AUMF.' 5 But
while that legal position might arguably extend even to the right to attack
AUMF targets on U.S. territory, no American president has gone so far (yet)
as to order the use of lethal force against a person on U.S. soil.1 6 There is,
however, another implication of counterterrorism as warfare-namely,
information operations, which is to say, the use and control of information as
a tool to deceive, confuse, and identify and locate the enemy.
The information operations analogy fits counterterrorism because the
primary challenge for counterterrorism officials is locating and identifying
domestic terrorists, as opposed to stopping identified terrorists. Locating and

identifying them is not only a geographic or spatial matter but also one of
discerning intentions and goals. Reading threatening or disturbing public
social media postings, following up on tips, and conducting electronic
surveillance of e-mails all find analogues in information operations. And
using undercover sting operations to discern the intentions and goals of the
targets serves a number of the purposes of information warfare, including
identification and deception of the enemy. But a critical conclusion of the
analogy is that such sting operations need to mimic actual terrorist recruiting,
or else they are not accurately identifying and detecting the enemy.
Part II of this Article discusses the threat of terrorism in the United States,
with particular emphasis on "lone wolf' attackers. Part III examines the role
that information plays in modern warfare, ranging from code breaking, to

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usal3) [https://perma.cc/V9RX
-66RA].
13. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
14. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization and the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2047 (2005).
15. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
16. Then-Vice President Cheney may have been prepared to order American fighter pilots
to shoot down hijacked Flight 93 had they intercepted it in time, but it does not appear that the
order was actually given. See NAT'L COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 40-42 (2004) [hereinafter THE 9/11 COMMISSION

REPORT]. Additionally, President Bush did invoke the AUMF to justify military detention of
two American persons, citizen Jose Padilla and resident Ali al-Marri, as "enemy combatants."
See Tung Yin, Enemies of the State: Rational Classificationin the War on Terrorism, 11 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 903 (2007).
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target detection, to communications jamming, to deception. Part IV describes
domestic counterterrorism policies, laying the groundwork for Part V, in
which the Article argues that those counterterrorism policies can be
analogized to information operations. Finally, Part VI draws lessons from the
information operations analogy for the counterterrorism tactic of undercover
sting operations.
II.

POST-9/11 DOMESTIC TERRORISM: THE THREAT VERSUS THE HYPE

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York and Washington,

D.C., were the exclamation point to a series of terrorist attacks launched by
organized foreign groups against U.S. targets beginning nearly two decades

earlier with two Hezbollah-directed suicide bombings in Lebanon in 1983.17
Other attacks against U.S. targets overseas included the 1993 ambush of U.S.
troops in Somalia (the "Black Hawk Down" mission); 8 the 1996 Khobar
Towers bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which killed nineteen U.S. Air
Force personnel;1 9 the 1998 simultaneous bombing of U.S. embassies in

Kenya and Tanzania; 20 and the surprise attack on the destroyer U.S.S. Cole
while it was docked in Yemen in late 2000.21

Meanwhile, in 1993, terror struck the homeland when Ramzi Yousefnephew to 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed-carried out a truck
bombing of the World Trade Center that killed six and injured over 1,000
people. 22 Yousef was in the midst of testing a follow-up attack that would
have bombed eleven airplanes over the Pacific Ocean when he was captured

17.

See

Beirut

Marine

Barracks

Bombing

Fast

Facts,

CNN,

https://www.cnn.com/2013/06/13/world/meast/beirut-marine-barracks-bombing-fast-facts/in
dex.html [https://perna.cc/4FPH-AXRJ]. Arguably, one could date the beginning of this current
wave of terrorism to 1979, with the Iranian takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. See MARK
BOWDEN, GUESTS OF THE AYATOLLAH: THE FIRST BATTLE IN AMERICA'S WAR WITH
MILITANT ISLAM 28-64 (2006); BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 258 (rev. ed. 2006)

("The pivotal event in the emergence of state-sponsored terrorism as a weapon of the state and
an instrument of foreign policy was doubtless the seizure in November 1979 of fifty-two
American hostages in at the U.S. embassy in Tehran by a group of militant Iranian 'students."').
18. American forces were stationed in Mogadishu. See, e.g., MARK BOWDEN, BLACK
HAWK DOWN: A STORY OF MODERN WARFARE

3 (1999).

19. LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER 237 (First Vintage Books ed., Vintage
Books 2007) (2006).
20. Id. at 306.
21. Id. at 360-61.
22.

See SIMON REEVE, THE NEW JACKALS: RAMZI YOUSEF, OSAMA BIN LADEN AND THE

FUTURE OF TERRORISM 6-15 (1999). Yousef and his co-conspirators had hoped to topple one
tower into the other, with the ensuing carnage killing as many as tens of thousands. Id. at 24.
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by Pakistani authorities in 1995 and rendered to the United States. 23 In that

same year, Timothy McVeigh parked a truck bomb next to the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City. The blast destroyed the building, killed 168
people, and injured over 500 others. 24
A.

Expert Disagreementon the Nature of the Threat

In the years after 9/11, two of the country's leading terrorism experts
embarked on a vociferous debate about the true nature of the terrorism threat
faced by the United States.25 The view that had dominated American

counterterrorism

policy,

as

exemplified

by RAND

(Research

and

Development) Corporation's Bruce Hoffman, continued to view top-down

terrorism directed by al Qaeda and other international groups as the top
priority, despite the destruction of al Qaeda's terrorism training camps in
Afghanistan and the routing of its Taliban protectors by 2002.26 According to
Hoffman, al Qaeda still represented a serious threat to the United States "more
as an ideology that [had] become a vast enterprise" with the capability to plan
new attacks. 27 At the time he published the second edition of his book Inside
Terrorism, al Qaeda still counted among its members "at least eighteen
thousand individuals who trained in [its] Afghanistan camps," as well as
ample funds. 28

The challenger to the status quo was Marc Sageman, a former covert CIA
officer who spent the late 1980s helping Afghan fighters against the Soviet
Union. 29 Sageman then obtained a Ph.D. and became a forensic psychiatrist,
specializing in the study of murderers. 30 In 2004, Sageman published
UnderstandingTerror Networks,3 1 in which he argued that the main threat to

the United States from the global jihadist movement came not from al Qaeda
and other organized terrorist groups, but small networks of like-minded

23. Id. at 77-91, 105-07.
24. Lou MICHEL & DAN HERBECK, AMERICAN TERRORIST: TIMOTHY MCVEIGH AND
THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING 229-34 (2001).

25. Elaine Sciolino & Eric Schmitt, A Not Very Private Feud Over Terrorism, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 2008, at WK1.
26. See HOFFMAN, supra note 17, at 263-85.
27. Id. at 281-82. While Hoffman did recognize that al Qaeda-inspired individuals and
groups also posed a threat to the United States, he nevertheless concluded that "the most salient
threat . . continues to come from al Qaeda Central." Id. at 288.
28. Id. at 284.
29.

MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS,

at vii

(2004).

30. Id. at viii.
31. See id. at vii.
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friends.3 2 Whereas Hoffman saw al Qaeda as having reconstituted itself into a
decentralized entity still with considerable access to funds and trained
members, Sageman argued that the initial U.S. military response to 9/11 had
scattered the surviving al Qaeda leadership and deprived the group of its
training camps, financial assets, and communication links. 33
Hoffman and Sageman argued so vociferously because each perceived a
different primary threat and, hence, a different primary response. Based on his
assessment of the nature of the continuing terrorist threat to the United States,
Sageman argued for more local steps, including attempts to penetrate the
jihadist network through friends or family members of an identified individual
aligning himself with the ideology of the global movement. 34 Hoffman,
meanwhile, pushed for continued pressure (military and otherwise) on al
Qaeda and international terrorist groups.
In fact, as Peter Bergen observed in 2016,35 recent events suggested that

Sageman and Hoffman were both correct in terms of assessing the severe
threat level posed respectively by lone wolves and organized terror groups, 36
but perhaps both were incorrect in terms of asserting that the other expert's
focus was less worthy of concern. To be sure, U.S. counterterrorism policy
does not need to focus exclusively on one perceived threat while ignoring the
other perceived threat. To the extent that some threats emanate from foreign
terrorist groups in essentially lawless areas, the United States can and does
respond through military action. Similarly, to the extent that there are
domestic-based threats, the United States can and does respond through more
traditional law enforcement techniques, including the use of electronic
surveillance and undercover sting operations. 37

32. Id.
jihadist cases
33. Id.
34. Id.

at 111-12 (arguing that friendship was an important factor in 68 percent of the
"on whom there was adequate information").
at 51-52.
at 180-81.

35. PETER BERGEN, UNITED STATES
HOMEGROWN TERRORISTS 105-07 (2016).

OF

JIHAD:

INVESTIGATING

AMERICA'S

36. Indeed, neither Hoffman nor Sageman took the absolutist position that the only true
threats came from the source focused on. See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 17, at 271 (recognizing
the threat from loosely networked terrorists); SAGEMAN, supra note 29, at 137-38 (discussing
the "Central Staff cluster" of al Qaeda i.e., bin Laden and other key members as one of the
four major clusters of the "global Salafi jihad").
37. Adam Goldman, Domestic Terror Rises, and FBIFeels Its Limits, N.Y. TIMES, June
5, 2019, at Al.

Published by Scholar Commons,

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 2 [], Art. 10
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

530
B.

[VOL. 71: 523

"Lone Wolf" Terrorists

The Hoffman-Sageman debate concerned the main source of terrorism
following the disruption of al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan-or,
more precisely, the mechanism by which radical Islamic terrorism was likely
to continue to arise in the United States. (Again, it must be acknowledged that
not all terrorism within the United States is perpetrated by Muslims and that
there are terrorism experts who believe that white supremacist groups pose an
equal, if not greater threat of domestic terrorism than do Muslim extremists.) 38
Lone wolf terrorists pose a severe societal challenge, because they are
often undetectable until they act.39 They do not require much training,
expertise, or resources. 40 A single person carrying firearms and extra

ammunition can inflict devastating casualties in a short time span, as has been
demonstrated on a discouragingly frequent basis: 41
"

Major Nidal Hasan, an Army psychiatrist, bought a
semiautomatic pistol and several hundred rounds of ammunition,
and practiced target shooting for several weeks, before opening
fire on November 5, 2010, at the Fort Hood military base where

he was stationed. 42 In just ten minutes, he fired over 200 shots,
killing thirteen and wounding thirty others. 43

38. See, e.g., MIKE GERMAN, THINKING LIKE A TERRORIST 65-66 (2007).
39. See, e.g., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. & FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, JOINT
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, USE OF SMALL ARMS: EXAMINING LONE SHOOTERS AND SMALL-

UNIT TACTICS 2 (2011) [hereinafter USE OF SMALL ARMS] ("Attacks by lone offenders which
by definition lack co-conspirators, and therefore provide fewer opportunities for detection may
be more difficult for law enforcement and homeland security authorities to disrupt."); David
Horsey, Opinion, Despite Colorado TheaterMassacre, a Discussion of Guns is offLimits, L.A.
TIMES (July 24, 2012), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/topoftheticket/la-na-tt-theatermassacre-20120724-story.html [https://perna.cc/VF84-Y2BJ] ("There was nothing that could
have prevented that unless someone saw him loading his car with guns.").
40. See USE OF SMALL ARMS, supra note 39, at 2.
41. See GRAFF, supra note 1, at 573 (quoting FBI official as saying "[y]ou may not be
able to shoot down an airliner with a Stinger, but you can still shoot up a mall"). To be sure,
there is a question as to whether mass shootings constitute terrorism, but for current purposes,
the shooters' intent to cause mass casualties should be enough to treat these incidents as ones
warranting the same law enforcement focus as truck bombs and other more traditional forms of
terrorism. Tung Yin, When Is It Terrorism?,WASH. POST, June 18, 2017, at B1.
42. Scott Huddleston, Hasan Sought Gun with High Magazine Capacity,'
MYSANANTONIO.COM, Oct. 21, 2010, https://blog.mysanantonio.com/military/2010/10/hasansought-gun-with-high-magazine-capacity/ [https://perma.cc/4UEC-ESX4].
43. James Dao, 12 Killed, 31 Wounded in Rampage at Army Post; Officer is Suspect,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2009, at Al.
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Jared Loughner bought a pistol a little more than a month before
engaging in a mass shooting in January 2011 at a supermarket in

Tucson, Arizona, killing six people (including Chief U.S.
District Judge John Roll) and injuring twelve others (including

U.S. Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords). 44
*

James Eagan Holmes bought four guns and several thousand
rounds of ammunition in May 2012; two months later, he

committed what was then the worst mass shooting in the United
States, killing twelve and wounding fifty-eight at a movie
theater.41
*

Stephen Paddock used an arsenal of AR-15 semiautomatic rifles
and other firearms to attack attendees at a music festival in Las
Vegas on October 1, 2017.46 From his suite on the thirty-second

floor of the nearby Mandalay Bay Hotel, he was able to fire 1,100
rounds, killing fifty-eight and injuring over 500 in the worst mass

shooting incident in the United States. 47
*

Omar Mateen stormed a nightclub in Orlando, Florida, on June
12, 2016, and used a semiautomatic rifle and a handgun to kill

forty-nine people and wound fifty-eight others. 48
*

Nikolas Cruz used an AR-15 semiautomatic rifle to kill
seventeen students and teachers and wound seventeen others in a
Florida high school. 4 9

44. Marc Lacey & David M. Herszenhorn, 19 Are Hit; Six Die, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011,
at Al.
45.

See Jack Healy, Theater Gunman is SparedDeath in Aurora Case, N.Y. TIMES Aug.

8, 2015, at Al.
46. C.J. Chivers & Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Before Onslaughtof Gunfire, Attacker Traced
Efficient Path, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2017, at Al.
47. See id.
48. Rene Stutzman, Pulse Gunman Was ExpertMarksman, His FormerRange Instructor
Recalls, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 23, 2016, at Al.
49. Julie Turkewitz et al., FloridaShootingSuspect DisplayedFlashesof Rage and Other
Warning Signs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2018, at Al; Mark Berman, Parkland Inquiries
Underscore Struggle to Grapple with Massacre's Horrors, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2019, at A2.
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Nor are lone wolves limited to shooting their victims. Just as mass
shootings occurred before 9/11, so too had there been bombing attacks,
including the 1995 destruction of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols:5 1
*

Soon after 9/11, British citizen

Richard

Reid boarded a

transatlantic airline and tried to detonate a bomb built in his shoe.
5' Had the bomb exploded, it could very well have caused the
plane to crash, but fortunately Reid was unable to light the fuse
and was subsequently subdued by passengers and flight crew.52
*

Eight years later, Nigerian citizen Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
tried to succeed where Reid had failed: instead of a shoe bomb,
however, Abdulmutallab had sewn explosive material into his
underwear. 53 Also unlike Reid, Abdulmutallab managed to light
his improvised device; again, passengers and flight crew were
able to foil the plot.54

*

In May 2010, Faisal Shahzad attempted to car bomb Times

Square in New York City; the bomb failed to explode despite
being ignited.55
*

Rezwan Ferdaus planned to attack the Capitol Building by
crashing a remote-controlled model plane filled with plastic
explosives.

56

50. See generally MICHEL & HERBECK, supra note 24, at xi-xxi.
51. Richard Reid Fast Facts, CNN (Mar. 25, 2013), https://www.cnn.com
/2013/03/25/us/richard-reid-fast-facts/index.html [https://penna.cc/9K9H-S92R].
52. Id.
53. Scott Shane, FBIInterviews Tell of Cleric'sRole in Bomb Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
2017, at A9.
54. Id. Because of Reid's failed attempt, the Transportation Security Agency has been
requiring air travelers to remove their shoes during security screening. We are lucky that TSA
did not implement similar measures after Abdulmutallab's failed effort.
55. Aaron Katersky, FaisalShahzad Pleads Guilty in Times Square Car Bomb Plot,
Warns of More Attacks, ABC NEWS (June 21, 2010), https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/faisal[https://perma.cc/8UDPshahzad-pleads-guilty-times-square-car-bomb/story?id=10970094
FWVK].
56. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Man Sentenced in Boston for Plotting
Attack on Pentagon and U.S. Capitol and Attempting to Provide Detonation Devices to
Terrorists (Nov. 1, 2012), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/boston/press-releases/2012/man-
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Brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokar Tsarnaev were able to detonate
two homemade bombs near the finish line of the Boston
Marathon in April 2013, killing three and injuring nearly 300
spectators.1

By comparison, the 9/11 attacks-admittedly much greater in scope and
casualty count-needed nineteen perpetrators, eight of whom had sufficient
piloting skills to crash the jet airplanes into the Twin Towers and the
Pentagon, as well as $400,000-$500,000 to fund their planning and
conducting of the attack. 58 It was so complicated that pieces of the attack

aroused the suspicions of various U.S. intelligence analysts before 9/11:
*

CIA and FBI intelligence agents had identified Khalid alMihdhar, who would later help hijack Flight 77, as a suspected
al Qaeda member and urged unsuccessfully in August 2001 that
he be put on a watchlist. 59

*

In the summer of 2001, FBI Special Agent Kenneth Williams

wrote a memo raising concerns, based on investigation of flight
schools in Arizona that al Qaeda had sent members to learn to fly
airplanes. 60
*

Contemporaneously with, but independently of, Special Agent
Williams's investigation, the FBI office in Minneapolis detained
Zacarias Moussaoui, a French national, officially for
immigration violations, but in reality due to his suspicious

sentenced-in-boston-for-plotting-attack-on-pentagon-and-u. s-capitol-and-attempting-toprovide-detonation-devices-to-terrorists [https://perna.cc/YWJ7-FX7M].
57. Jess Bidgood, Massachusetts:Nov. 3 Trialis Set for Defendant in MarathonKillings,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2014, at A19.
58. THE 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 4, 169.
59. Due to the Department of Justice's interpretation of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, the FBI intelligence analysts believed that they could not share information
about al-Mihdhar with FBI agents on the criminal investigation side, and so field agents could
not be enlisted to search for him. For more on this intelligence failure, see GRAFF, supra note 1,
at 302-04.
60. AMY B. ZEGART, SPYING BLIND: THE CIA, THE FBI, AND THE ORIGINS OF 9/11, at
160 (2007). Williams' memo was especially relevant, given an August 6, 2001 presidential daily
briefing that noted rumors of an al Qaeda-planned hijacking or other attack on U.S. passenger
airlines. See THE 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 260-62.

Published by Scholar Commons,

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 2 [], Art. 10
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

534

[VOL. 71: 523

behavior at a local flight school. 6' The field office was denied
permission by the Justice Department to seek a Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant to search
Moussaoui's laptop computer, which would have revealed links
to al

"

Qaeda. 62

Mohammed al-Qahtani, long suspected of being the intended
fifth hijacker on Flight 93, was denied entry to the United States
on August 3, 2001, by a skeptical U.S. immigration agent due to

al-Qahtani's use of a one-way airplane ticket and his lack of
money, any hotel or lodging reservations, or any contact

information for anyone he knew in the country, and his
aggressive demeanor. 63

Of course, the 9/11 attacks were not stopped, and it is far from clear that
they would have been stopped had any or all of the suspicions and warnings
been checked out. The counterterrorism czar for the Clinton Administration,
Richard Clarke, had presciently foreseen the danger that al Qaeda posed and
had continuously agitated in the late 1990s for military action against it and
the Taliban to disrupt the threat. 64 In hindsight, Clarke was correct, both as to
the imminence and scale of the threat, and also as to the prescription, but he
was ignored at the time, and it is not hard to see why; without the 9/11 attacks,
there would not have been political will to engage in military action on the
other side of the world. 65 The point is rather that, while both may be difficult
to detect, between the 9/11 plot and lone wolf terrorism, the latter presents
even greater challenges because there are fewer "moving parts." 66
In the mass shooting lone wolf incidents, the perpetrators used legally
purchased firearms. 6 7 Some practiced extensively or had prior weapons

62.

See THE 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 273.
See id. at 273-76.

63.

See KURT EICHENWALD, 500 DAYS: SECRETS AND LIES IN THE TERROR WARS

61.

10-

12 (2012).
64.

See RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA'S WAR ON

TERROR 202-03 (2004).
65. See STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA, AFGHANISTAN,
AND BIN LADEN, FROM THE SOVIET INVASION TO SEPTEMBER 10, 2001, at 390-91 (2004)

(noting pushback against Clarke).
66. Once detected, of course, a lone wolf should be easier to stop than an organized group.
67. Billy Kenber, At Court-Martial,PsychiatristAdmits to FortHood Shootings, WASH.
POST, Aug. 7, 2013, at A3; Alex Lockie, The Las Vegas Gunman Chose a Terrifying Vantage
Point 3-5 FootballFieldsAway and 32 Levels High that Enabled Him to Shoot People 'Like
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training before engaging in the shooting rampage. 68 The attempted bombers

obviously did not use legally obtained weapons, but constructed them from
regular chemicals and other supplies. 69 Fewer does not always mean none,
however, and many of the mass shooters described above did in fact give some
signs of dangerousness. Orlando shooter Omar Mateen had been investigated
twice by the FBI, talked to others about his desires to kill co-workers, and
frequently expressed his disdain for gays and lesbians (among others). 70
Parkland shooter Nikolas Cruz posted a picture of himself with guns and, in
his post, said that he planned to shoot the school that he ultimately attacked;
and at least three people had warned law enforcement authorities (including
the FBI) that Cruz was dangerous.'

Unfortunately, pointing out red flags retrospectively after a terrorism
incident is not particularly difficult. Instead, the challenge is determining
beforehand whether the red flags merit law enforcement action.
C.

Terrorism as Asymmetric Warfare

At its heart, terrorism is a form of asymmetric warfare within Carl von
Clausewitz's definition of war as the "continuation of political activity by
other means" 2-that is, the use of violence to achieve geopolitical goals. At
least until the 1990s, terrorist groups generally had demands that they issued

Fish in a Barrel,' BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 3, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/stephen[https://perna.cc/6XHBpaddock-las-vegas-shooting-weapons-vantage-point-room-2017-10
7XCQ]; see, e.g., Charlotte Alter, Orlando Shooter Bought Gun Legally, Store Owner Says,
TIME
(June
14,
2016),
http://time.com/4367592/orlando-shooting-gun-store-owner/
[https://penna.cc/396Z-B9U5].
68. Stutzman, supra note 48 (noting Omar Mateen took a firearms course in
2011 and his instructor described Mateen as "an expert marksman"). See generally Evan Perez
et

al.,

Orlando Shooting:

Killer's Behavior

Had Long

Been

an

Issue,

CNN

(June 17, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/17/us/orlando-shooter-omar-mateen/index.html
[https://perma.cc/PP7L-RTAF] (noting Omar Mateen attempted to buy body armor before
opening fire at Pulse nightclub.
69. Katersky, supra note 55.
70. Lizette Alvarez & Richard Pdrez-Pena, PraisingIsis, Gunman Attacks Gay Nightclub,
N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2016, at Al.
71. Red flags: The Troubled Path of Accused ParklandShooter Nikolas Cruz, WASH.

&

POST (March 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/timelineparkland-shooter-nikolas-cruz/?utm_term=.9965c57512ed [https://perma.cc/VP6W-Q9G5].
72. See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds.
trans., 1984).
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openly; the acts of terrorism were carried out in an effort to coerce the target
government to give in to the groups' demands. 73

Unlike traditional military conflicts, in which the armed forces of nationstates engaged in combat in accordance with the laws of war, terrorists cannot
fight directly against the United States (or most other developed nations).
They likely would be outnumbered and outgunned by local law enforcement
as well as the military.74 As a result, terrorists now frequently try to hide
among and within the general population. For example, during the planning

and preparation phase of the 9/11 attacks, the hijackers received training from
mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed "on Western culture and travel."7 5
After training, the hijackers returned to Germany, from which they would

ultimately depart for the United States. 76 While in Germany, the hijackers
altered their outward behavior, their dress, and even the company they kept,
so as "to avoid appearing radical." 7 7

This is not to say that military forces do not conceal themselves from their
enemy to avoid being attacked. The difference is that under the laws of war,
military combatants may conceal their presence but not their identity from
their adversaries. 78 In other words, if military combatants are detected, they
are required to be readily identifiable as lawful targets or they risk losing

73. See Gary LaFree & Laura Dugan, Research on Terrorism and CounteringTerrorism,
38 CRIME & JUST. 413, 442, 452 (2009). These two characteristics are in fact related, as the
terrorism of that era was meant to draw attention to a particular cause, rather than to inflict
maximum death and destruction. Id. at 452. See also HOFFMAN, supra note 17, at 238 (noting
that right-wing terrorism in Europe in the 1970s was "based not on some pathological obsession
to kill or beat up as many people as possible but rather on a deliberate policy of intimidating the
general public into acceding to specific demands or pressures").
74. Experts have estimated al Qaeda's membership after 9/11 at a few hundred to a
thousand. Carl Bialik, Shadowy Figure: Al Qaeda's Size Is Hard to Measure, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 10, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903285704576560593124
523206 [https://perma.cc/RJ6W-9E6E].
75. THE 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 157.
76. Id. at 167.
77. Id.
78. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention] (defining captured
belligerents entitled to prisoner-of-war status as those readily identifiable as such); see also JEAN
S. PICTET, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION

RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 52 (1960) ("It is the duty of each State
to take steps so that members of its armed forces can be immediately recognized as such and to
see to it that they are easily distinguishable from members of the enemy armed forces or from
civilians.").
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prisoner of war status. 79 To the extent terrorists are seeking to claim the mantle
of "freedom fighters" or other irregular combatants, they are failing to comply
with this obligation. In addition, the laws of war prohibit combatants from
deliberately attacking civilian targets; 80 yet, terrorists often (but not always) 8
attack "soft" targets such as civilian buildings, 82 passenger aircrafts, 83 and
other venues with large gatherings of people.84
The primary counterterrorism challenge, therefore, is identifying the
would-be terrorist. Stopping a known terrorist plot is, by contrast, much
easier. On a number of occasions, government agents identified suspected
terrorists and were confident enough in their ability to stop any potential plot
that the agents were willing to monitor and wait rather than arrest
immediately.85 For example, after the FBI learned from Scotland Yard in 2009

that al Qaeda leadership had instructed Najibullah Zazi to attack New York
subways,86 federal agents spent weeks patiently listening to intercepted
telephone calls, searching motel rooms in which he had stayed, and otherwise

79. Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 art. 37(1)(c), June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocols Additional I]. In fact, a military combatant who
attacks while pretending to be a non-combatant commits the war crime of perfidy. Legal
definitions of terrorism do not include elements of perfidy expressly, focusing instead on the
targets of and the motivation for the attack. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2018).
80. Protocols Additional I, supra note 79, art. 51.
81. THE 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 190.
82. Some representative examples of targeted buildings include the World Trade Center
in 1993 and 2001 and the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. See, e.g., REEVE,
supra note 22, at 6-15; MICHEL & HERBECK, supra note 24.
83. In addition to the four airplanes hijacked on 9/11, other terrorism plots against U.S.
civilian aircraft include the attempts by Richard Reid in late 2001 and Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab in late 2009 to detonate explosives in their shoes and underwear, respectively;
and a pre-9/11 plot by Ramzi Yousef (the architect of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing)
to blow up eleven airplanes simultaneously. See REEVE, supra note 22, at 6-15; Shane, supra
note 53; RichardReid FastFacts, supra note 51.
84. See generally Jack Healy & John Eligon, Survivors Relive Horror: 'He Shoots
Toward My Head,' N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2016, at A13 (describing mass shooting in Orlando
nightclub that killed 49 people); Ken Belson et al., Sniper Inflicts 'Total Chaos'in Las Vegas;
Police Seek a Motive as Death Toll Hits 59, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2017, at Al (describing mass
shooting in Las Vegas that killed 58 people). On whether mass shootings should be considered
terrorism, see generally Tung Yin, Were Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber the Only White
Terrorists?: Race, Religion, and the Perception of Terrorism, 4 ALA. CIV. RTS. & CIV.
LIBERTIES. L. REV. 33 (2013).
85. See infra notes 86-101.
86.

British Spies Help Prevent al Qaeda-Inspired Attack on New York Subway

TELEGRAPH (Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/
usa/6529436/British-spies-help-prevent-al-Qaeda-inspired-attack-on-New-York-subway.html

[https://penna.cc/Z2B4-C8MS].
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gathering evidence of his intent. 87 At one point, the FBI asked local New York
police to stop Zazi's car under the pretense of a random checkpoint, but when
the ensuing search produced no explosives, Zazi was released.88 FBI agents

even interviewed him on three successive days without arresting him, before
finally taking him into custody on September 19.89

In other instances, terrorists were not identified until after their attempted
plot, but were still arrested or captured without incident. 90 Faisal Shahzad built
a car bomb whose fuse he lit after parking the vehicle near Times Square in
New York, but the bomb failed to detonate due to faulty construction; 91
Shahzad was apprehended a little over two days later when he tried to board
a flight from New York to Pakistan. 92
III. WARFARE AND INFORMATION

The thesis of this Article is that domestic counterterrorism operations are
best conceived as a form of information operations (or information warfare)
whose value lies primarily in detecting, disrupting, and confusing would-be
terrorists, and secondarily in providing a basis for prosecuting those caught in
the stings. To the extent warfare is about the controlled application of violent

87. Dina Temple-Raston, Terrorism Case Shows Range of Investigators' Tools, NPR,
(Oct.
3,
2009),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=113453193
[https://perma.cc/CMB9-22GJ].
88. Id.
89.

Frank James, Afghan Man, Focus ofTerror Probe, Arrestedwith Fatherand 3rdMan,

NPR
(Sept.
20,
2009),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2009/09/afghan man_focus_of_terror_pro.html [https://penna.cc/Z5WN-FNFZ].
90. See infra notes 91-92.
91. Katersky, supra note 55.
92. Id. Not all of the identified domestic terrorists in recent years were captured so easily.
Brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsamaev were identified as suspects within three days of their
attack on the 2013 Boston Marathon after they killed a local police officer, carjacked an SUV,
and robbed the driver. Joe Tanfani et al., Boston Bombing [Update]: Door-to-DoorManhunt
Locks Down City, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/laxpm-2013-apr-i9-la-na-nn-boston-bombing-suspects-20130419-story.html
[https://perma.cc

/2HNY-ECSA]. The older brother (Tamerlan) was killed during a shootout with police when the
younger brother ran over him in the carjacked SUV while escaping; over a dozen officers were
injured, including one who died nearly a year later. Id. For the next day, while Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev remained at large, federal and local law enforcement agents conducted a house-byhouse search while shutting down most local commercial and public transportation. Id
Eventually, the seriously wounded Tsamaev was found hiding in a boat. Pierre Thomas et al.,
Boston Bomb Suspect Captured Alive in Backyard Boat, ABC NEWS, (Apr. 19, 2013),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/boston-bomb-suspect-captured-alive-backyardboat/story?id=18994511 [https://perma.cc/TG92-X9D9].
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force against enemy forces, information operations might be seen as auxiliary
in nature-increasing the effectiveness of one's own attacks and degrading
the enemy's attacks and defenses. Electronic surveillance, public monitoring
of social media, and undercover sting operations similarly serve an auxiliary
function of increasing the effectiveness of attacks (prosecution) and degrading
the enemy's attacks (prevention).
Accordingly, this part of the Article provides an examination of
information operations in the military context. The Department of Defense
defines "information operations":

"The integrated employment, during

military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other
lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making
of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own." 93
According to the Defense Department, concepts related to information
operations include electronic warfare and military deception. 94 Electronic
warfare is defined as "[m]ilitary action involving the use of electromagnetic
and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the
enemy."95 Military deception consists of "[a]ctions executed to deliberately
mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization
decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or
inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly
mission." 96 Separate from electronic warfare and military deception, but also
involving information and warfare, is the use of electromagnetic or sound
waves to detect the presence and movement of enemy forces.
A.

Code Breaking, Radarand Sonar, and CommunicationsJamming

For nearly the entirety of human history, success in warfare has been
driven by technological advances. Archimedes conceived heat ray technology
by using polished concave shields to reflect and concentrate the sun's rays on
enemy ships, setting them on fire; supposedly, the invading "Roman sailors
were sent into deepening panic at each new weapon deployment." 97 The

ancient fire weapon known as Greek Fire, a prehistoric forerunner of modern
napalm, provided Greek warriors with a nautical advantage over rival

93.

DEP'T. OF DEF., DOD DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 106

(2019).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 72.
96. Id. at 143.
97. ADRIENNE MAYOR, GREEK FIRE, POISON ARROWS AND SCORPION BOMBS:
BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 218 (2003).
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Byzantines and Arabs and "caused enemies to 'shiver in terror' and capitulate
in despair." 98 The development of gunpowder similarly provided a temporary

but significant edge to those armed with guns and rifles. 99 The culmination of
weapons of mass destruction-nuclear weapons-arguably ended World War
11.100
Warfare in the twentieth century saw the rise of significance of something
besides the increase in destructive capacity: control of information.101 Modern
code breaking, electromagnetic detection systems (like radar), and electronic
countermeasures (to jam enemy systems) are aimed at gaining and controlling

information relevant to the military theater. 0 2 While the technological
advancement in weapons systems was important to the Allied victory in
World War II, so too was the information advantage that the Allies enjoyed,
as discussed below.1 03
1.

Code Breaking and Deception

Encryption of military messages was known as far back as the time of
Julius Caesar, if not earlier, with simple substitution ciphers.1 04 For example,
one could replace every letter in the plaintext (the original message) with the
corresponding letter, say, three spaces forward in the alphabet turns the
sentence "the quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog" into apparent
gibberish: "wkh txlfn eurzq ira mxosv wkh odcb grj." By encrypting

messages, military personnel could communicate with one another across
distance without needing to worry about the possibility of interception of the

98. Id. at 242.
99. See id at 17, 213 (noting the inventing of gunpowder in China and its use in weapons).
100. See THOMAS C. REED & DANNY B. STILLMAN, THE NUCLEAR EXPRESS: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE BOMB AND ITS PROLIFERATION 23-25 (2009).

101. See Loren Thompson, Electronic Warfare: The Part of the F-35 Fighter Story You
Haven't
Heard,
FORBES
(Jan.
9,
2018),
https://www.foibes.com/sites/

lorenthompson/201 8/0 1/09/electronic-warfare-the-part-of-the-f-35-fighter-story-you-havent-he
ard/#5eaf2b2968cc [https://perma.cc/TPX9-W5S3] ("Modern warfare is waged largely on the
electromagnetic spectrum.").
102. See id.
103. Neal Stephenson's techno-thriller novel Cryptonomicon makes the point during a
theoretical discussion between two characters about the different aspects of warfare represented
by the Greek gods Ares and Athena, with the former being "mindless, raging violence," and the
latter being "intelligence [and c]unning." NEAL STEPHENSON, CRYPTONOMICON 804-08 (First
Perennial ed., HarperCollins 2000) (1999). The U.S. won World War II and Germany lost, one
character asserts, because "the Germans worshipped Ares and we worshipped Athena." Id. at
807-08.
104. SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK 9 (1999).
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messages by the enemy; that is, even if the enemy were to capture the
messenger, the message itself would be unreadable.1 05
From that point on, cryptanalysts (i.e., code breakers) and cryptographers
have been engaged in a cryptology arms race.1 06 The simple substitution

cipher noted above is quite vulnerable to a codebreaker familiar with English,
since "wkh" is repeated, and there are relatively few common three letter
words in the English language. Moreover, sufficiently lengthy ciphertext can
be subjected to letter frequency analysis; e is the most common letter in plain
English, showing up approximately 12% of the time, so any letter in ciphertext
that appears around that frequency is almost certainly e.1 07
Code breaking played a significant role in the Allied victory in World
War II.108 At the time, German forces used a fiendishly complex machine
known as Enigma to encrypt their military communications,1 09 while Japanese
forces used a similar machine that U.S. cryptanalysts called "PURPLE."" 0
Once the Allies were able to decrypt intercepted transmissions in a timely
fashion, they had access to Axis attack plans, ship and troop movements, and
other military intelligence."' For example, during World War II, the United
States won the pivotal battle of Midway in part because the Navy was able to
prepare for the attack, having had advance warning due to an intercepted and
partially

decoded

Japanese

transmission.1 1 2 A

year

later,

American

cryptanalysts deciphered a Japanese naval communication informing troops
that Admiral Yamamoto, the architect of the Pearl Harbor attack, would be
touring Japanese-held Solomon Islands and New Guinea." 3 Armed with
Yamamoto's flight plan, U.S. forces ambushed and shot down his plane."4
Being privy to a wartime adversary's battle plans is thus incredibly
valuable. So too is the ability to manipulate and deceive an adversary through
deliberately leaked misinformation, and to assess and evaluate the
effectiveness of the deception by reading the enemy's communications. In
1942, American and British forces were preparing to attack German forces in

French North Africa; because "[t]here was no way to hide the large buildup

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 6.
See generally id. at 6-7.
See id. at 17.
Id. at 186-87.
Id. at 127.

110. DAVID KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS: THE STORY OF SECRET WRITING 1 (1967).
111. WALTER LORD, INCREDIBLE VICTORY: THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY 20 (1967).

112. See id at 18-23; KAHN, supra note 110, at 567-69.
113. STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, BATTLE OF WITS: THE COMPLETE STORY OF CODEBREAKING
IN WORLD WAR II, at 319 (2000).

114. Id. at 319; KAHN, supra note 110, at 595-601.
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of naval forces at Gibraltar," the Allies needed to deceive Germany from the
actual target." 5 They did so by leaking false attack plans through newspapers
and other sources, and then were able to read decoded German
communications identifying Malta, Libya, or Italy as the likely targets"-which was confirmation that the deception had worked. As one commentator
has put it, "[T]he synergy of signals intelligence and deception paid off so
richly."'"7

In today's world, military deception need not rely on such crude methods
as leaking false attack plans or "building fake airfields to
mislead . . . bombers.""1 8 Instead, assuming a sufficient level of technological
advancement on the part of the enemy, it is possible to change or corrupt the
enemy's data: "Alter the proper ones and zeroes, and as far as the enemy
knows, we've got another bomber wing."11 9 Although such a cyberattack does
not do physical damage to enemy assets, it can affect the enemy's military
strategy, misdirecting or possibly even deterring an attack.120
2.

Locating Targets Through Radaror Sonar

The interception and decryption of military communications with ship
movements or aircraft itineraries is not the only way to locate enemy forces.
In some instances, such as the interception and decryption of the Japanese
battle plan to invade Midway Island, signals intelligence may provide only
the adversary's strategic intention, or perhaps tactical plans, but not the exact
location of warships.121 Over the course of a day and a half, the U.S. Navy
found Japanese ships through conventional visual spotting by scout aircraft.1 22
Electromagnetic detection systems such as radar provided a means to detect
enemy aircraft location and velocity beyond the line of sight, or when
darkness or weather cut down on visual perception.1 23

115. BUDIANSKY, supra note 113, at 274.
116. Id. at 274-75.
117. Id. at 275 ("The landings at Morocco and Algiers the next day achieved total strategic
surprise.").
118. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, INFORMATION WARFARE 9 (1997).

119. Id. at 11.
120. See Clay Wilson, Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar:
Capabilitiesand Related Policy Issues, in ELECTRONIC WARFARE: DEFENSE, SECURITY, AND

STRATEGY SERIES 166, 169-70 (Adam T. Elsworth ed. 2010).
121. LORD, supra note 111, at 20.
122. Id. at 65-67.
123. MERRILL

I.

SKOLNIK, RADAR HANDBOOK 1-2 (1970).
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The earliest radar systems worked by sending a radio wave outward,
where it would meet a target, and some of the energy would be bounced back
toward the radar system.1 24 Because the speed of the radio wave was known

to the radar system, the distance to the target could be determined based on
the delay between the sending of the radio wave and the reception of the
bounce back signal.1 25 Additional information about the target, such as
altitude and radial velocity, could be determined through trigonometry and
physics.1 26 Sonar is a similar system that uses the propagation of sound waves
in water to detect the presence of other objects, including vessels or natural
obstacles.1 27 The radar or sonar systems described above engage in what is
known as active detection because they use energy (or sound) actively.1 28
In contrast to active detection systems are passive detection systems,

which do not propagate electromagnetic or sound waves of their own but,
instead, rely upon other transmitters in the vicinity.1 29 Much in the same way
that distant astronomical objects can be detected even when not visible due to
their gravitational impact on their neighbors, passive detectors infer the
presence of an object due to the impact on known transmissions such as
television, radio, and cellular signals. 3 0 Another system sometimes known as
passive

coherent

location

or electronic

support

system

operates

by

"exploit[ing] active emissions from the target."131 In other words, these are

124. Id.
125. Tung Yin, Game of Drones: Defending Against Drone Terrorism, 2 TEX. A&M L.
REv. 635, 651 (2015).
126. Id.
127. Sonar, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/sonar [https://perma.cc/HX56-8B6Y].
128. See Brian H. Maranda, Passive Sonar, in HANDBOOK OF SIGNAL PROCESSING IN

ACOUSTICS 1757 (Havelock et al. eds., 2008).
129. See Antonio Moccia et al., BISTATIC RADAR: EMERGING TECHNOLOGY RADAR: 1

(Mikhail Chemiakov ed., 2008) ("Bistatic radar operates with separated transmitting and
receiving antennas."); Ian Steadman, Passive' Radar Could Render Stealth Planes Obsolete,
WIRED
(Oct.
1,
2012),
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/radar-detects-stealth-aircraft
[https://perma.cc/4U5W-AKP6] ("Passive radar detects radiation signals emitted by other
sources be they radio broadcasts or mobile phone networks and analyses distortions to figure
out where objects are located.").
130. Steadman, supra note 129 ("[T]he detector system looks at a host of signals floating
in the atmosphere already (like aforementioned radio and mobile phone signals) and looks for
how they're blocked or altered by having to pass through or around objects.").
131. Bill

Sweetman,

New

Radars,

IRST

Strengthen

Stealth-Detection Claims:

Counterstealth Technologies Near Service Worldwide, AVIATIONWEEK NETWORK (Mar. 16,
2015), http://aviationweek.com/technology/new-radars-irst-strengthen-stealth-detection-claims
[https://perma.cc/9PM2-76NG]; Ollie Holt, Technology Survey: A Sampling ofRWRs and ESM
Systems, J. ELECTRONIC DEF., June 2015, at 39 ("As the ES system scans the environment, radar
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radar detectors-and by detecting unknown or unexpected radars, passive
coherent location systems can alert to the presence of hostile aircraft or
ships. 132
Passive detection systems avoid a major downside of active detection
ones, which is that the active radiation or sound emissions of the latter can
draw the attention of enemy attackers.1 33 In essence, when a radar is turned on
and begins sending radio waves outward, it is like turning on a flashlight in a
dark room; the person using the flashlight can see, but someone else in the
room now knows where the person is located. Active detection systems are
thus vulnerable to counterattack. During the first Gulf War, Coalition Forces
unleashed British ALARM and U.S. HARM anti-radiation missiles to zero in
on and destroy Iraqi radar air defense systems.

34

As one commentator notes,

"Nowadays, the existing radar surveillance systems of the Air Defense system
have very little chance of surviving the first phase of a military conflict, not
to mention surviving its whole duration, which was proved by the few recent

ones."1 35
The practical dilemma that radar users face is that there is a tradeoff
between active versus passive detection; the former offers more precision and
more useful information than the latter but also increases the risk of counter
detection.1 36
3.

Interfering with Enemy Communications (Jamming)

In addition to manipulating or deceiving the enemy, or locating the

enemy's position, electronic warfare can take the form of directly attacking

signals are detected (pulsed or continuous wave [CW]) and the parameters of the signals are
measured."); Maranda, supra note 128, at 1757 ("The difference between passive and active
sonar is that a passive sonar system emits no signals; instead, its purpose is to detect the acoustic
signals emanating from external sources.").
132. See Sweetman, supra note 131.
133. See MARY ROACH, GRUNT: THE CURIOUS SCIENCE OF HUMANS AT WAR 253 (2016).

134. See Stanislaw Czeszejko, Anti-Radiation Missiles vs. Radars, 59 INT'L J.
ELECTRONICS & TELECOMM. 285, 285, 287 (2013); see also JOURNAL OF ELEC. DEF., INT'L

ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES HANDBOOK 152 (Michael Puttrd et al. eds., Horizon House
Pub. 2004) ("The missile was designed to be able to beat a SAM to the punch by taking out its
guidance radar.").
135. Czeszejko, supra note 134, at 291.
136. The Last Ship, (TNT television broadcast 2014). The Last Ship, a serialized thriller
drama on TNT, frequently depicts naval warfare (either surface versus submarine, or surface
versus surface) in which the combatant ships have to be careful about using active radar or sonar,
because doing so will give away their location.
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the enemy's own information gathering, communications, or both. 3 7 By
sending "unwanted signal energy into the receivers in the [enemy's]
communication system," the attacker can "cause the receivers to demodulate
the signal from the jammer as opposed to the communication transmitter." 38
In other words, the jammer floods the target's receivers with its nonsense
signals, thereby overriding the authentic signals, possibly even destroying the
equipment. 3 9 Successful jamming does not deceive or manipulate the enemy.
Rather, it interferes with the enemy's use of information, causing radar-guided
weaponry to lose their lock on their targets or blocking enemy forces from
communicating with one another.1 4 0
4.

Limits on Information Operations

We should be careful not to overestimate the value of intelligence. As
John Keegan notes, "Knowledge, the conventional wisdom has it, is power,
but knowledge cannot destroy or deflect or damage or even defy an offensive
initiative by an enemy unless possession of knowledge is also allied to
objective force."141 As Keegan points out, Polish cryptanalysts were the first
ones to decipher the German Enigma code, but their intelligence success did
not save Poland from Germany. 142 The United States did better at Midway
but, even with advance knowledge of the Japanese attack plans, could have
lost the battle.1 43 Keegan's observation about the limits of intelligence is
important, but of less concern in the context of counterterrorism, where the
primary challenge is detecting the terrorist plots and identifying the terrorists;
stopping a known threat is considerably easier.

137. See RICHARD A. POISEL, INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNICATION ELECTRONIC
WARFARE SYSTEMS 189 (2002); see also DEP'T OF ARMY, Electronic Warfare in Operations,
in ELECTRONIC WARFARE: DEFENSE, SECURITY, AND STRATEGY SERIES 36, 46-47 (Adam T.

Elsworth ed. 2010) ("Electronicjamming is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, or reflection
of electromagnetic energy for the purpose of preventing or reducing an enemy's effective use of
the electromagnetic spectrum.").
138. POISEL, supra note 137, at 189.
139. See Wilson, supra note 120, at 169.
140. See id.
141. JOHN KEEGAN, INTELLIGENCE IN WAR: KNOWLEDGE OF THE ENEMY FROM
NAPOLEON TO AL-QAEDA 348 (2003).

142. Id.
143. Id. at 220 ("A little less intuition by McClusky of Bombing 6, a little more intellectual
resolution by Admiral Nagumo and it would have been the carriers of TF 16 and 17, not those
of Yamamoto's Mobile Force, which would have been left burning and bereft in the bright
waters of the Pacific on 4 June 1942.").
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IV. POST-9/11 DOMESTIC
EXAMPLES

COUNTERTERRORISM

POLICY:

TACTICS

AND

The immediate American response to 9/11 consisted of a nationwide

sweep of hundreds of noncitizen males from Middle Eastern countries into
immigration detention,1 44 along with the rounding up of a small number of
men as material witnesses.1 45 In November 2001, the Bush Administration

commenced military attacks in Afghanistan against al Qaeda and Taliban
targets pursuant to the congressional Authorization to Use Military Force.1 46
Apart from a tiny number of notable exceptions, however, the military
response remained distinct from domestic counterterrorism operations.1 47
Thus, neither the Bush nor Obama Administrations resorted to drone strikes
or indefinite military detention within the United States.1 48
The only person prosecuted in federal court in direct connection to 9/11
was Zacarias Moussaoui,149 a French national who had been detained since
August 2001 on immigration charges.15 0 Over the course of nearly six years

144. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Inspector General Issues
Report on Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the
Investigation of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks (June 2, 2003).
145. HUM. RIGHTS. WATCH, WITNESS TO ABUSE: HUMANS RIGHTS ABUSES UNDER THE
MATERIAL WITNESS LAW SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, at 15 (2005).

146. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 1-2, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
147. The exceptions involved an American citizen captured in Afghanistan (John Walker
Lindh), an American citizen arrested at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago (Jose Padilla),
and a lawful resident (Ali Saleh al-Marri). United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 545-47
(E.D. Va. 2002); Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 388 (4th Cir. 2005); al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534
F.3d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J., concurring). Conversely, Padilla and al-Marri were both
arrested at first and subsequently detained in military brigs under the jurisdiction of the Defense
Department. Tung Yin, Coercion and Terrorism Prosecutions in the Shadow of Military
Detention, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1255, 1264-68 (2006).
148. See Yin, supra note 147, at 1290 n.191. (describing the differences between domestic
law enforcement and military action).
149. Timeline: The Case Against Zacarias Moussaoui, NPR (May 3, 2006),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5243788
[https://perma.cc/6VBSLVLP]; see United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 266 (4th Cir. 2010). For an archived
copy of the indictment, see Indictment, UnitedStates v. Moussaoui, 292 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D.
Va. 2003) (No. 01-455-A).
150. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 266; THE 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 273-76.
Moussaoui had drawn the attention of the FBI field office in Minneapolis because an instructor
at the local flight school where he was taking flight lessons found his behavior and intentions
suspicious. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI's HANDLING OF
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RELATED TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (2004)

https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0606/chapter4.htm

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol71/iss2/10
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of criminal litigation, which included several trips from the district court to
the court of appeals and back,151 Moussaoui eventually pleaded guilty to
terrorism-related conspiracy charges and proceeded to the penalty phase of
the trial.' 5 2 Although he was eligible for the death penalty, he ultimately
received a life sentence.1 53
The bulk of persons charged with terrorism-related federal crimes (i.e.,
those found in Chapter 113B of the U.S. Code) from September 12, 2001, to

early 2004 were indicted for providing material support to designated terrorist
organizations in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A or § 2339B.154 Some of the
more notable early cases included a group of Yemeni-Americans from a
suburb of Buffalo who pleaded guilty to providing material support to al
Qaeda when they traveled to Afghanistan in summer 2001 to participate in the

agent who investigated found it further suspicious that Moussaoui had $30,000 in a bank account
with no visible means of income. THE 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 273. Fearing
that Moussaoui was planning to hijack a plane, the FBI agent and local immigration agents
decided to take Moussaoui into immigration custody for overstaying his visa. Id.
151. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 458-62 (4th Cir. 2004).
152. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 266.
153. Timothy Dwyer, One Juror Between Terrorist and Death: Moussaoui Foreman
Recalls Frustration,WASH. POST, May 12, 2006, at Al.
154. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-SupportLaws and the
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 20 (2005). 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2018) states
in its current form:
Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results,
shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, a
person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist
organization (as defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or
engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act), or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as
defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1988 and 1989).
§ 2339B(a)(1). The second sentence in the statutory provision was added in 2004. See
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6003(c), 118
Stat. 3638 (2004). This clarified the mens rea element so as to enable the government to
prosecute persons who provided material support to organizations that they knew engaged in
terrorism, even if they did not know that the State Department had designated the recipients as
terrorist organizations. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act § 6603(c).
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terrorist group's training camps,1 55 and a different group from Portland who
tried to enter Afghanistan after 9/11 and made it as far as Pakistan.1 56

The material support prosecutions were not free of controversy. One line
of criticism was that "material support" was defined so broadly by statute that
it included cash, so that donating to a group such as Hamas (which the State
Department has designated an FTO) would run afoul of the statute, even if the
donor had sincerely intended for the cash to be used to provide food, clothing,
or social services.15 7 The central reason for such a broad prohibition is that
money is fungible, so even if the donor specified that his or her donation
should be used only for humanitarian purposes, such donation would allow
Hamas to divert money that otherwise have used for those humanitarian
purposes into additional terrorism funds.1 58 Under this same reasoning,
however, al Qaeda could justify its attacks on American civilians on the
grounds that, as taxpayers, those civilians were funding U.S. military
operations-which, in al Qaeda's view, were unjust.1 59
Another line of criticism of the material support prohibition was that it
went so far as to squelch legitimate free expression. In one notable case, a
nonprofit organization wanted to teach a designated terrorist group to use
nonviolent avenues of international law to achieve its goals but feared that
doing so would constitute providing "expert advice" (which was one category
of material support).160 The Supreme Court eventually ruled that

§ 2339B did

not violate the First Amendment because it did not prohibit independent
speech, only coordinated activity with designated terrorist groups. 161
Since then, U.S. domestic counterterrorism investigations have involved
a variety of often complementary tactics, including (1) monitoring of publicly

155. See United States v. Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242, 244-45 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). For a
sympathetic account of the defendants with more background, see generally DINA TEMPLERASTON, THE JIHAD NEXT DOOR: THE LACKAWANNA SIX AND ROUGH JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF
TERROR (2007).
156. See STEVEN T. WAX, KAFKA COMES TO AMERICA: FIGHTING FOR JUSTICE IN THE
WAR ON TERROR: A PUBLIC DEFENDER'S INSIDE ACCOUNT 90-96 (2008) (providing

background on the Portland defendants from the perspective of the then-Federal Public Defender
for the District of Oregon).
157. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 13-14 (2010) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006) (currentversion at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2018)).
158. Id. at 31 (quoting Declaration of Kenneth R. McKune, App. 128, ¶9).
159. Ward Churchill, at the time the chair of the Ethnic Studies department at the
University of Colorado, made this very argument in an online essay (later expanded into a book)
posted on September 12, 2001. See Ward Churchill, "Some People Push Back": On the Justice
ofRoosting Chickens, DARK NIGHT FIELD NOTES, Sept. 12, 2001.
160. See Holder, 561 U.S. at 14-15.
161. Id. at 38.
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available social media postings; (2) following up on tips; (3) collecting e-mail
and other communications; and (4) stinging targets. 6 2

A.

MonitoringPubliclyAvailable SocialMedia Postings
1.

Chat Rooms, SocialMedia Sites, and Other InternetPages

One of the primary sources of information for counterterrorism agents has
been the public Internet postings of the suspects. 63 Vague statements of
violence posted on one's Facebook page without specific targets or details

might not provide probable cause to arrest a person,1 64 but they may warrant
further attention from law enforcement authorities. For example, in 2010,
when Antonio Martinez, a twenty-year-old with a theft conviction in his past
and an adoptee of a radical interpretation of Islam, posted statements on
Facebook that "glorified jihad . . and warned . . 'the sword is cummin [and]
the reign of oppression is about 2 cease inshallah,"'1 65 a government
informant brought the postings to the attention of the FBI.1 66 The subsequent
investigation, which was conducted largely by the informant, led to
Martinez's arrest for plotting to blow up a military recruiting center with a car
bomb.6 7 Nor was Martinez unique in this regard; a few examples of others
who publicly exposed their violent intentions include the following:
*

Colleen LaRose, known as Jihad Jane, who "used MySpace,
YouTube, and e-mails to express her desire to become a martyr
for the Islamic cause,"1 68 and was convicted of terrorism-related
charges in 2010;169

162. See BERGEN, supra note 35, at 217 (noting impact of informant and community tips
and other traditional law enforcement in counterterrorism).
163. See infra notes 163-72.
164. Cf Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,449 (1969) (holding "incitement to imminent
lawless action" to be outside First Amendment protection); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343,
359-60 (2003) (holding that a State may punish a "[t]rue threat" that "communicate[s] a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group
of individuals").
165. Tricia Bishop, Guilty Plea in Bomb Plot:Martinez Admits Guilt in Bomb Plot, BALT.
SUN, Jan. 26, 2012, at Al.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See JEFFREY D. SIMON, LONE WOLF TERRORISM: UNDERSTANDING THE GROWING

THREAT 202 (2013).
169. See John Shiffman, U.S. Woman Known as JihadJane Sentenced to 10 Years in Plot,

REUTERS

(Jan.
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2014),
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*

Joseph Stack, who posted a greater than 3,000-word screed
against the Internal Revenue Service, the 2000 dot-com collapse,

and more, on his business website, and then crashed his small
plane into the building containing the Austin, Texas, office of the
IRS in December 2010;170

*

Richard Poplawski, who "frequented a neo-Nazi chat room on
the Internet and was responsible for killing three police
officers . . . in April 2009";'7'

*

Samir Khan, who authored Inshallah Shaheed (A martyr, God

willing), a blog in which he "praised attacks by al-Qaeda,"
"yearned for martyrdom," and continually called for jihad before
being killed in the same drone strike that killed Anwar
al-Aulaki;1 72
*

Zachary Chesser, who "became a star in the small, selfreferential world of English-speaking jihadist propaganda," and
who was later convicted of providing material support to a
designated foreign terrorist organization. 7 3

Or a person might go into a public chat room on the Internet and seek to
make contact with like-minded (i.e., those seeking to engage in terrorism)
individuals for collaboration, support, or instruction. 7 4 This would be an
example of what Eugene Volokh has termed "crime-facilitating speech," and

idUSBREA050PC20140106 [https://perna.cc/8AM7-7ENE]; see also Susan Candiotti, Jihad
Jane,

American

who

Lived

on

Main

Street,

CNN

(Mar.

10,

2010),

https://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/03/10/jihad.jane.profile/index.html
[https://penna.cc/87L5-ZL9L].
170. Richard Fausset, Suicide Pilot Hid HisAnger, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2010, at AA1.

171. SION, supra note 168, at 202.
172. See BERGEN, supra note 35, at 138-40, 210.
173. Id. at 148, 157.
174. MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 115-16 (2008); see Cora Currier, UndercoverFBIAgents Swarm the InternetSeeking
Contact
with
Terrorists,
INTERCEPT
(Jan.
31,
2017),

https://theintercept.com/2017/01/31/undercover-fbi-agents-swarm-the-internet-seeking-contact
-with-terrorists/ [https://perma.cc/D32Q-SJ4N] ("Because terror groups have made effective use
of online networks to spread propaganda and to connect with troubled individuals, the virtual
realm has become a significant counterterrorism theater for the FBI.").
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it poses societal dangers above and beyond mere advocacy of criminal
conduct because it may be "information that teaches people how to violate the
law, and how to do so with less risk of punishment ... ."75 As a result, the
FBI has taken to monitoring chat rooms that it suspects may provide users
with the means to connect with terrorist groups.17 6
One might wonder why lone wolf terrorists in particular (and terrorists in
general) would use social media given the possibility, if not likelihood, of
government monitoring of public sites. One answer is that, just as many
criminal suspects are induced to confess their crimes to police interrogators
out of a need to talk despite having been given Mirandawarnings,177 potential
terrorists feel a need to talk about what they are planning. 78 Another answer
is that social media serves more than a modern venue for venting but, in fact,
radicalizes potential terrorists through interaction with like-minded
participants. 7 9

To be sure, social media monitoring will not guarantee detection of all
potential domestic terrorists. Some will actively avoid public social media or
express their violent intentions offline (such as in a diary). 80 And of course,
the government cannot monitor every chat room discussion and social media
postings all of the time.

175. Eugene Volokh, Crime-FacilitatingSpeech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1107 (2005).
176. See, e.g., RONALD

KESSLER, THE TERRORIST

WATCH: INSIDE THE DESPERATE RACE

TO STOP THE NEXT ATTACK 173 (2007); SIMON, supra note 168, at 205; Currier, supra note
174; Michael S. Schmidt et al., Suspects in US. Who Don't Travel to Syria Are Even Harder to
Investigate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2015, at A17; Terroristsin the ChatRoom?, WIRED (Oct. 12,
2004), https://www.wired.com/2004/10/terrorists-in-the-chat-room/ [https://perma.cc/E2FA4JDS] (discussing government plan to fund a study on surveillance of chat rooms).
177. See Mark Bowden, The DarkArt ofInterrogation,ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2003,
at 51, 54, 72. But see DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 207 (Owl

Books 2006) (1991) ("[T]he majority of those who acknowledge their complicity in a killing
must be baited by detectives with something more tempting than penitence.").
178. SIMON, supra note 168, at 201 ("Lone wolves like to talk a lot.... Even loners have
a basic human need for contact with others.").
179. See SAGEMAN, supra note 174, at 115-16; cf CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC:

DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 114-15 (2017) (noting that social media
can intensify partisanship).
180. See e.g., Amir Vera, A Teen Wrote About Plans to Shoot Up His Washington High
School.

But

His

Grandmother

Found

His

Journal,

CNN

(Feb.

16,

2018),

https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/15/us/grandmother-foils-school-shooting-plan-everetttrnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/PH3L-MPFX].
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Privacy Concerns

In general, law enforcement officials have the same right as any member
of the public to read or observe nonprivate social media posts or chat room
discussions.181 As far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned, there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy over something that is knowingly exposed
to the public, and if there is no reasonable expectation of privacy to violate,
then there cannot be a search.18 2
Nevertheless, it would be understandable if a person were to feel uneasy
knowing or believing that government agents are reading his or her blog
postings or keeping tabs on chat room discussions.183 Indeed, such a person

might react by self-chilling himself or herself as if the government had
prohibited such speech.18 4 During the height of the Vietnam War, antiwar
protesters learned that U.S. Army intelligence agents had been attending and
writing reports about their public meetings.1 85 They argued that "[t]he

'deterrent effect' on First Amendment rights by government oversight marks
an unconstitutional intrusion,"1 86 but the Supreme Court concluded otherwise
in Lairdv. Tatum, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to show an actual or
threatened injury; they showed only a speculative one.1 87
Subsequently, in response to the Church Committee's investigation, led
by Senator Frank Church, of alleged civil rights abuses before and during the

181. See Heather Kelly, Police Embrace Social Media as Crime-Fighting Tool, CNN
(Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.cnn.com/2012/08/30/tech/social-media/fighting-crime-socialmedia/index.html [https://penna.cc/MA6Y-3 CXY].
182. See Katzv. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Some particulartypes of trespass
also constitute a search wholly independently of the expectation of privacy analysis. See United
States. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402, 413 (2012) (holding that unconsented placement of GPS
tracking device on suspect's car constituted a search); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11-12
(2013) (holding that bringing a drug-sniffing dog to a suspect's front porch constituted a search
even though a previous case held that the dog's sniff did not violate a reasonable expectation of
privacy).
183. One might even call it "stalking."
184. For example, not long after 9/11, I began researching an article contrasting moral
arguments against capital punishment with the willingness to live under the nuclear deterrence
umbrella. I did find myself wondering if some government agent had been tracking my library
borrowing, which consisted of several books on nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare theory.
185. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 6 (1972).
186. Id. at 25 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Lamontv. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301,
307 (1965)); see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("Awareness that the
Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.").
187. Laird, 408 U.S. at 13-14 ("Allegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate
substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.")
(citing United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947)).
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Vietnam War,' 88 Congress enacted the Privacy Act of 1974, which, among
other things, prohibited government agencies from keeping records about
"how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment
unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the
record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an
authorized law enforcement activity."1 89
Observing an individual's public writings (or chats) is not the same as
maintaining a record of that person's writings (or chats). The particular threat
the Privacy Act seemed to be aimed at was that posed by former FBI Director
J. Edgar Hoover, who kept quasi-personal files on "enemies of the United
States"-a group that included leaders of the American Civil Liberties Union,
Helen Keller, Dr. Martin Luther King, gays, and more.1 90 These files

contained, among other things, information "on the places where these people
gathered, the publications they read, and the political groups they joined."191
Armed with such information, Hoover was able to impose his will throughout
Washington, D.C., including over the occupants of the White House.1 92
Admittedly, there is still a concern that the government might go beyond
observing and monitoring public social media posts and, instead, maintain its
own records of those observations. The social media posts could be copied
and stored on government servers so that they would be available indefinitely,
even if the originals were deleted. Congress has recognized that retention of
material about or by an individual may present a distinct civil liberties threat
separate from the initial gathering of that material. The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, for example, permits U.S. officials to conduct electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes without the need to demonstrate
probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed.1 93
Among the material that FISA authorizes collection of are "call detail
records"-phone numbers and time and duration of calls, but not their

188. See SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOV'T OPERATIONS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, FINAL
REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 7-10 (1976).

189. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (2014), held unconstitutionalas not severable by Texas v.
United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
190. TIM WEINER, ENEMIES: A HISTORY OF THE FBI 61-62, 176 (2012); The History of
the
FBI's
Secret
Enemies'
List,
NPR
(Feb.
14,
2002),
https://www.npr.org/2012/02/14/146862081/the-history-of-the-fbis-secret-enemies-list
[https://penna.cc/2373-74F2].
191. WEINER, supra note 190, at 23-24.
192. See id. at 232.
193. 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2012). The required standard is, instead, probable cause to believe
that the target is an agent of a foreign power. Id.
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contents1 94-but with the additional proviso that judicial orders approving
such collection must include "minimization procedures" that require the
government to destroy promptly any "call detail records produced under the
order that the Government determines are not foreign intelligence
information."1 95
B.

Following up on Tips

Sometimes counterterrorism officials learn about potential suspects
through third-party tips. Those tips might come from a teen or adult child's
parents or other relatives, or peers, teachers, or neighbors. In the best case
scenario, government agents will act on the tip, conducting any necessary
investigation to corroborate the tip.1 96

One tip that resulted in an arrest before the suspect could carry out a
potential attack occurred in Washington in early 2018, when a grandmother
called the police after reading a number of disturbing journal entries by her
grandson along with finding a semiautomatic rifle.1 97 Local law enforcement
officials arrested the grandson on charges of attempted murder, with the diary
and the rifle providing enough probable cause for the arrest.1 98 In many other
instances, the tip brought someone to the attention of government agents for
further investigation.1 99

Informants are, of course, an important source of law enforcement
information, so much so that the Supreme Court has, over decades, issued

194. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(k)(3) (2012).
195. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(F)(vii) (2012). Such call details are generally not protected
under the Fourth Amendment. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979). FISA sets a
limit on how long those call details can be retained.
196. Cf Illinoisv. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237-38 (1983) (noting that tips, "particularly when
supplemented by independent police investigation, frequently contribute to the solution of
otherwise 'perfect crimes"').
197. Vera, supra note 180. The diary entries included the following: "I need to make this
shooting/bombing infamous. I need to get the biggest fatality number I possibly can. I need to
make this count.... I'm learning from past shooters/bombers mistakes, so I don't make the
same ones" and "I'm preparing myself for the school shooting. I can't wait. My aim has gotten
much more accurate. . . I can't wait to walk into that class and blow all those [expletive] away."
Id.; Eric Wilkinson et al., Everett 911 Call: He's Planning on Having a Mass Shooting at One
of
the
High
Schools,
K5
NEWS
(Feb.
15,
2018),
https://www.king5.com/article/news/crime/everett-911-call-hes-planning-on-having-a-massshooting-at-one-of-the-high-schools/281-518703506 [https://perma.cc/NE6X-B69X].
198. Vera, supra note 180.
199. See, e.g., United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 2016) ("And when
[the parents] could not reach Mohamud, they called the FBI and asked an agent to stop their son
from leaving the country.").
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multiple Fourth Amendment decisions that govern the use of tips in the
probable cause analysis. 200 A major concern of the probable cause doctrine
has been whether a tipster has sufficient reliability to warrant a conclusion
that the target of the tip is likely to be involved in criminal activity. Thus, in
Spinelli v. United States, the Court suppressed evidence obtained pursuant to

a search warrant that was based on an informant's tip because the warrant
application failed to provide any basis to evaluate the informant's reliability
and credibility. 20 ' Spinelli's strict requirement of minimum thresholds of
informant reliability and credibility was overruled in Illinois v. Gates, which

adopted a more flexible "totality of the circumstances" analysis; 20 2 however,
informant reliability and credibility remained relevant considerations, 20 3
especially with an anonymous tip, where there is no way to hold the tipster
"responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated .... "204
Tips about potential terrorists are no less vulnerable to these concerns.
After 9/11, various government agencies have frequently exhorted the public
that "if you see something, say something." 205 Fifteen years after 9/11, with
such "say something" notices still appearing in New York transit (among
other places), the police department was getting around 100 tips per day about
suspicious looking packages, yet according to the Washington Post, "[I]t's not

clear that the tip line has ever prevented an attack," and "[s]ome people even
use the hot line to call in phony bomb threats." 20 6

Still, wholly apart from the likely greater reliability and credibility of an
identified tipster who knows the suspect personally, one might also keep in
mind the caveat from Florida v. J.L., where the Court-in a unanimous

opinion-noted, "We do not say, for example, that a report of a person

200. Gates, 462 U.S. 213; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilarv. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933); see also Florida v. J.L.,
529 U.S. 266, 270-71 (2000) (analyzing role of an anonymous tip in terms of providing
reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop).
201. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 412-13.
202. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230.
203. Id. at 233.
204. J.L., 529 U.S. at 270; see also id. at 272 (noting the potential for an anonymous tip to
"enable any person seeking to harass another to set in motion an intrusive, embarrassing police
search of the targeted person simply by placing an anonymous call falsely reporting the
target[]").
205. See, e.g., If You See Something, Say Something, U.S. DEP. HOMELAND SEC.,
www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something [https://perma.cc/UM2V-QWKS]. See generally
Willian Neuman, In Response to

M. TA.

's 'Say Something' Ads, a Glimpse ofModern Fears,

N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2008, atBi.
206. Hanson O'Haver, Does 'See Something, Say Something' Make Us Safer?, WASH.
POST, Sept. 25, 2016, at B04.
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carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of
a person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a
frisk." 20 7
C.

Collecting E-Mail and Other Communications

In addition to checking up on publicly available social media postings and
chat room discussions and following up on tips, counterterrorism agents have
conducted secret surveillance of nonpublic communications such as emails. 208 Unlike the monitoring of social media postings and chat room
discussions, such surveillance implicates privacy rights because the
communications are not knowingly exposed to the public. 209
Of course, if law enforcement agents have sufficient probable cause that
a suspect has committed or is committing a crime, they may be able to obtain
a judicial order to intercept the suspect's oral, wire, or electronic
communications. 210 Alternatively, if federal agents have sufficient probable
cause to believe that a target is an agent of foreign power, they may be able to
obtain a foreign intelligence surveillance warrant to intercept that target's oral,
wire, or electronic communications. 2 11 These are essentially the electronic
equivalent of physical search warrants.
Not all of the government's electronic surveillance was directed at
specific individuals. 212 Since 9/11, several broad programs collectively known
as Stellar Wind have scooped up massive amounts of telephone and e-mail
information for data mining purposes. 213 In the abstract, such surveillance
sounds like a reasonable step. When the New York Times revealed the
existence of a government program to engage in warrantless surveillance of

207. J.L., 529 U.S. at 273-74.
208. Trevor Aaronson, NSA Secretly Helped ConvictDefendants in US. Courts, Classified
Documents Reveal, INTERCEPT (Nov. 30, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/11/30/nsasurveillance-fisa-section-702/ [https://perma.cc/6W4B-VW64] ("The government intercepts
Americans' emails and phone calls in vast quantities using this spying law and stores them in

databases for years.").
209.
210.
211.
212.
What You

Cf Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 361 (1967).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2018).
50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2012).
See James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country's Biggest Spy Center (Watch
Say), WIRED (Mar. 15, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/03/ff-nsadatacenter/

[https://penna.cc/HT95-6VE9].
213. See id.; ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH'S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 153

(2008).
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calls involving some U.S. citizens, 214 President Bush defended the program
on the grounds that it was necessary to detect and listen in on calls from al
Qaeda operatives on one end to persons in the United States on the other end

"[t]o save American lives." 2 11
In a famous incident in 2003, two key members of the Bush Justice

Department (acting Attorney General James Comey and Assistant Attorney
General Jack Goldsmith) became aware of the details of one of these programs
and nearly precipitated a revolt when they determined that the programknown as the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP)-was unlawful in its
existing form due to the lack of any judicial oversight. 216 The program
required the Attorney General's approval for reauthorization. 217 Comey

persuaded Attorney General John Ashcroft that the TSP needed to be changed
to address the legal problems, but Ashcroft fell severely ill with pancreatitis,
leaving Comey as the acting Attorney General. 218 When Comey refused to
reauthorize it, President Bush sent Chief of Staff Andrew Card and White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to Ashcroft's hospital to get Ashcroft to
overrule Comey. 219 What resulted then was a frantic race to see who would
get to Ashcroft first, Comey and Goldsmith, or Card and Gonzales. 220 Comey

and Goldsmith won the race and re-briefed Ashcroft, and then when Card and
Gonzales arrived, Ashcroft stated that he did not think the TSP was legal in
its current form, "But that doesn't matter, because I'm not the attorney
general. 22 1 There (pointing at Comey) is the attorney general."

222

Two days

later, when summoned by the White House to discuss the TSP, Comey-along

214. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets US. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
215. President George W. Bush, The President's News Conference (Dec. 19, 2005), in 41
WEEKLY COMP. PRESS DoC. 1885; see also President George W. Bush, Remarks to the Military
Officers Association of America (Sept. 5, 2006), in 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRESS DoC. 1563 ("If
Al Qaida is calling somebody in America, we need to know why in order to stop attacks.").
216. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 182 (2007) (alluding to the issue
but unable to provide details, presumably due to pre-publication clearance requirements);
GRAFF, supra note 1, at 484 (quoting Goldsmith as "conclud[ing] that the surveillance program
'was the biggest legal mess I'd seen in my life,"' and noting Goldsmith's disclosure of the
program to Comey).
217. Colleen Shalby, Comey, Mueller and the Showdown at John Ashcroft's HospitalBed,
L.A. TIMES (May 17, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-mueller-comeyashcroft-domestic-surveillance-20170517-story.html [https://penna.cc/99BY-9WG9].
218. GRAFF, supra note 1, at 485.
219. Id. at 487.
220. Id. at 487-88.
221. Id. at 488.
222. Id.
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with FBI Director Robert Mueller, Goldsmith, Ashcroft, and several other
high-ranking Justice Department lawyers-was prepared to resign rather than
reauthorize the program without necessary changes. 223 President Bush agreed

to let Comey implement those changes. 224 The Obama Administration
continued a version of this program, which was leaked to The Guardian in

2013 by a government contractor named Edward Snowden. 225 The Obama
Administration defended the surveillance program as "a critical tool in
protecting the nation from terrorist threats."
D.

226

Stinging Targets

Almost three years after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration added
undercover sting operations to its counterterrorism toolkit. 227 To be sure, the
line between the earlier

§ 2339B cases and the subsequent sting cases is not a

bright one, considering that some of the earlier cases also involved
government informants and many of the initial sting cases resulted in § 2339B
charges. 228 Beginning in 2004, however, the degree of interaction between
informants (or even undercover agents) and targets shifted from the passive
end of the spectrum toward the active one. 229
1.

From Early MaterialSupport Stings to Later Fake Bomb Stings

Thus, in 2004, when thirty-four-year-old Yassin Aref and forty-nine-

year-old Mohammed M. Hossain were arrested for money laundering,
conspiring to provide material support to terrorism, and making a false
statement to a federal agent, 230 the government's confidential informant acted
as more than a mere conduit of overheard conversations. Instead, the

223. Id. at 489-492.
224. Id. at 492.
225. Glenn Greenwald, US OrdersPhone Firm to Hand over Data on Millions of Calls,
GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, at 1.
226. Dan Roberts & Spencer Ackerman, U.S. Admits Surveillance of Calls Has Gone on
for Years, GUARDIAN, June 7, 2013, at 4.
227. See Jon Sherman, A Person Otherwise Innocent': Policing Entrapment in
Preventative, Undercover CounterterrorismInvestigations, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1475, 1477-

78 (2009).
228. See CTR. ON LAW & SEC., N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD:

SEPTEMBER 11, 2001-SEPTEMBER 11, 2011, at 26 (2011), https://www.lawandsecurity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/09/TTRC-Ten-Year-Issue.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZE95-TYH6].
229. See Sherman, supra note 227, at 1475-78.
230. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Aref, No. 04-M-330-DRH, 2007 WL 603508
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2007).
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informant, who faced prosecution on unrelated charges as well as removal
proceedings by Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 231 engaged in actions
without which the defendants could never have completed any of the objects
of the conspiracy. 232 According to the government, Hossain and the informant
agreed to a scheme to sell a portable surface to air missile (SAM) for $50,000,
with the proceeds to be laundered through Hossain's pizzeria. 233 Aref became
involved as a witness to the agreement. 23 4

While Hossain willingly discussed violent jihad with the informant
(though Hossain stated that "now was not the time for" it), 235 it was the
informant who proposed the SAM-money laundering scheme. 23 6 Hossain was
ripe for the proposal, as he was in need of money, having previously asked
the informant for a financial loan,237 but was primarily reactive rather than
proactive. At trial, Hossain raised an entrapment defense unsuccessfully, and
on appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed with the briefest of reasoning: "The
government's evidence of predisposition sufficed [to defeat the entrapment
defense] because it showed 'the accused's ready response to the inducement'
to commit the crime." 238

Aref and Hossain were not the first terrorism defendants ever to be caught
through a sting, 239 but they did help usher in the post-9/11 use of such
operations at an increasing level in terms of frequency as well as
aggressiveness. One critic of terrorism sting operations observed in 2013 that

"federal prosecutors announce arrests from terrorism stings at a rate of about
one every sixty days, suggesting either that there are a lot of ineffective
terrorists in the United States, or that the FBI has become effective at creating
the very enemy it is hunting." 240

231. Id. ¶ 5.
232. See id. ¶ 3.
233. Id. ¶¶ 11.
234. Id. ¶¶7-11.
235. Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
236. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.
237. Id. ¶ 8.
238. See United States v. Aref, 285 F. App'x 784, 791 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing United States
v. Salerno, 66 F.3d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1995)).
239. In The Terror Factory, Trevor Aaronson identifies Imran Mandhai as the first target
of the "aggressive terrorism sting operations . . . that the FBI would replicate over the next
decade." TREVOR AARONSON, THE TERROR FACTORY: INSIDE THE FBI's MANUFACTURED

WAR ON TERRORISM 65 (2013). Though convicted in 2002 via guilty plea, Mandhai's criminal
conduct conspiracy to bomb local electrical transformers in Florida based on the work of two
FBI informants-occurred before 9/11. See United States v. Mandhai, 375 F.3d 1243, 1245-47
(11th Cir. 2004).
240. AARONSON, supra note 239, at 34.
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COUNTERTERRORISM AS INFORMATION

OPERATIONS

If we think of domestic terrorism as asymmetric armed conflict and
counterterrorism as our military response, then we can map the various
aspects of information operations into their law enforcement analogues.
Recall that information operations are aimed at achieving three strategic
goals:

(1)

determining enemy

plans

(code

breaking

of intercepted

communications); (2) locating enemy forces (radar, sonar); and (3) disrupting
enemy

information

gathering

(jamming,

deception).

Domestic

counterterrorism operations are aimed at similar goals of (1) identifying
potential terrorist attacks and potential terrorists; (2) determining whether
potential terrorists intend to carry out attacks; and (3) disrupting those
potential attacks and capturing those potential terrorists.
A.

Detecting and Identifying the Enemy

In conventional warfare, the enemy must be detected and identified before
it can be attacked. Detection is primarily an exercise in spotting-whether
visually or through some other means such as radar or sonar-potential
military vehicles or personnel before they might attack, and identification is
an exercise in ascertaining whether those vehicles or personnel are indeed
hostile combatants. Unfortunately, conventional warfare provides a limited
analogy to counterterrorism. This is true because conventional warfare is
governed by the laws of war, which, among other things, require combatants
to wear uniforms (or distinctive signs and to carry arms openly) when
fighting. 241 This requirement ensures that combatants can be distinguished
from civilians, who cannot be lawfully targeted for attack. 242
Terrorists, on the other hand, typically blend in even when they are
carrying out their attacks. 243 The 9/11 hijackers were dressed like ordinary
passengers and indeed were coached by mastermind Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed to blend in with Americans. 244 The perpetrators of the other two

241. See Geneva Convention, supra note 78; OFF. OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP'T OF
DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 5.5.8 (2016) ("Combatants have certain obligations to
distinguish themselves that include, but are not limited to, those times when they conduct
attacks.").
242. Toni Pfanner, Military Uniforms and the Law of War, 86 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 93,
94 (2004).
243. Jim McKay, The Changing Face of Terror in the U.S., EMERGENCY MGMT.

(Feb. 7, 2011), https://www.govtech.com/em/safety/Face-Terror-US-Home-Grown.html
[https://perma.cc/BDF2-D5Z5].
244. THE 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 167.
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post-9/11 airline attacks-"shoe bomber" Richard Reid and "underwear
bomber" Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab-similarly passed themselves off as

regular passengers. 245 In fact, one of the only terrorists who wore a uniform

during his attack was the Fort Hood shooter, Nidal Hasan; 246 however, in this
instance, the uniform helped conceal his deadly intentions, because he was
attacking the military base at which he had been stationed just prior to his
anticipated deployment to Afghanistan. 247

Hence, there is an important difference between terrorism and guerilla
warfare. The guerilla fighter conceals himself among the civilian population
so as to avoid being attacked, but wears a uniform or otherwise displays a
distinctive sign while engaging in actual hostilities. 248 True, the guerilla
fighter is detectable for only brief periods of time and on his own timetable,
advantages that seem to run afoul of the general laws of war. Thus, when
Protocol I to the Geneva Convention was adopted in 1977, granting prisoner

of war status to guerilla fighters, the United States signed the treaty, but
subsequently, President Reagan refused to ratify it due to concerns that it
"grant[ed] guerillas a legal status that is often superior to that accorded to
regular forces." 249
By eschewing any distinguishing clothing or fixed signs, the terrorist goes

one step beyond the guerilla fighter. Both are difficult to detect because they
hide among the general population when dormant, but vigilant
counterinsurgency military personnel can at least identify guerilla fighters
when they attack-and not merely because they are attacking but because, at
that moment, they are identifiable as combatants due to uniforms or fixed
signs. 25 0 This means that the counterterrorism agent's challenge is an order of

245. See David Ariosto & Deborah Feyerick, Christmas Day Bomber Sentenced to Life in
Prison, CNN (Feb. 17, 2012), https://www.cnn.com/2012/02/16/justice/michigan-underwearbomber-sentencing/index.html [https://perma.cc/JSZ5-R376]; see also RichardReid FastFacts,
supra note 51.
246. Philip Sherwell & Nick Allen, Fort Hood Shooting: Inside Story ofHow Massacre
on
Military
Base
Happened,
THE
TELEGRAPH
(Nov.
7,
2009),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/6521578/Fort-Hood-shootinginside-story-of-how-massacre-on-military-base-happened.html [https://perma.cc/9SK6-78UB].
247. Helen Pidd & Ewen MacAskill, Fort Hood Gunman Shouted Allahu Akbar' as He
Opened Fire, GUARDIAN, Nov. 6, 2009, at 17.
248. See Pfanner, supra note 242, at 94.
249. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Protocol II
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-2, at IX (Jan. 29, 1987).
250. To use a science-fiction pop culture analogy, it's as if the guerilla fighter has cloaking
technology but has to de-cloak to attack, just like the Romulan warship in the Star Trek episode
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magnitude more difficult than the soldier's because the counterterrorism agent
must generally identify the enemy by divining their intentions through

observation of statements and actions.
1.

Passive Detection

As discussed earlier, passive detection systems work by analyzing the
disruption of known transmissions by an interfering object (i.e., the target). 25 1

Passive detection thus requires an understanding or expectation of what the
background transmissions would look like in the absence of any temporary
disruption. 252 Fixed physical transmitters such as television and radio
broadcast stations and cellular towers provide a clear basis for ascertaining
such background transmissions. 253 The analogical equivalent of passive

detection in the counterterrorism context would be the disruption to the local
community caused by noticeable and concerning behavior by a community
member. Perhaps the member has recently begun showing signs of
radicalization or expressing thoughts of violence. Or perhaps the person
moved recently and alarmed the local community due to his radicalism.
In 2006, a man named Farouk al-Aziz began showing up at mosques in

southern California, attempting to blend in with the other Muslims. 254 Soon,
al-Aziz began talking about jihad and martyrdom, and asking if there were
others who were similarly interested. 255 One community member told the Los
Angeles chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) about
al-Aziz; the CAIR in turn reported al-Aziz to the FBI as a possible terrorist. 256

As it turned out, al-Aziz was a false identity assumed by FBI informant Craig
Monteilh, whose alarming behavior was, he claimed, the product of
aggressive coaching by his government handlers. 257
Admittedly, there are limits to this analogy. The human rhythms of a local
community are a far cry from electromagnetic transmissions. A community

"Balance of Terror," whereas the terrorist can attack while cloaked. See Star Trek: Balance of
Terror, (NBC television broadcast Dec. 15, 1966).
251. See Steadman, supra note 129.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See Paul Harris, The Ex-FBI Informant with a Change of Heart: "There is No Real
Hunt.
It's
Fixed."
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
20,
2012),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/20/fbi-informant
[https://perma.cc/9XXU837E]; see also AARONSON, supra note 239, at 106.
255. Harris, supra note 254.
256. AARONSON, supra note 239, at 106.
257. Id.; Harris, supra note 254.
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may have its own distinct ethnic, or racial, or religious character, 258 but such
character is still more mutable than fixed electromagnetic transmissions. In
the absence of de jure segregation (which is, of course, unlawful),
communities are not legally bound to remain fixed by ethnicity, race, or
culture. For example, Baldwin Hills, a southern California community
described as "the heart of L.A.'s black community," in recent years has seen
its African-American population decline as its Latino population increases,
forcing the local city councilperson to adapt, as well as to face the possibility
of being the last African-American representative for that district. 259
There are thus several lessons to draw from the limits of the analogy to
passive detection. First is the importance of good relationships between

counterterrorism authorities and the relevant communities expected to provide
the background for passive detection. Even if the community character is
sufficiently distinctive and cohesive so as to register the disturbance by a
potential terrorist in its midst, there is a separate question of whether a
counterterrorism agent would be able to detect that disturbance, much in the
same way that a passive detector must be sensitive enough to detect
electromagnetic interference. The agent would need to have a sufficiently
detailed understanding of the neighborhood to be able to detect such
disturbances directly or, more likely, have some relationship with community
members such that the latter would feel comfortable reporting their concerns.
This cooperative relationship between law enforcement and community
is one of the desired outcomes of so-called community policing. Although
there is not a settled definition of community policing, James Forman Jr. has
described it as "an organizational strategy for running a [police]
department," 260 thus encompassing a variety of tactics that police departments
have used in an effort to develop stronger relationships with local
communities. 261Other scholars have defined community policing by the types

258. See Tung Yin, Is "Diversity" Diverse Enough?, 21 ASIAN AM. L.J. 89, 120-23
(2014).
259. Angel Jennings, Reaching Out: In the Heart of L.A. 's Black Community, a
Councilman Must Win Over a Fast-GrowingLatino Community, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2016, at
B.
&

260. James Forman, Jr., Community Policing and Youth as Assets, 95 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 7 (2004).

261. Id. (citing Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan for their discussions of "neighborhood

prayer vigils, gang loitering ordinances, and 'order maintenance' strategies" as examples of
community policing).
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of collaborative activities that police officers engage in with community
members. 262
Notwithstanding

its intuitive

appeal

as

a counterterrorism

tool,

community policing has limitations. Since 9/11, the federal government has
largely assumed the primary counterterrorism role, with the FBI ranking

counterterrorism as its top priority. 263 Yet, the sheer size of a typical federal
law enforcement agency's jurisdiction makes it difficult to develop the same
kind of community relationship that a local law enforcement agency can. The
FBI has approximately 13,500 special agents spread across fifty-six divisions

in the entire United States; 264 New York City has nearly three times as many
law enforcement officers responsible for policing only the city limits. 265 Local

law enforcement officers are more involved in the local communities and
therefore have greater opportunities to engage in community policing,
particularly given their responsibility to investigate or prevent a variety of
common street crimes. 266

Perhaps in response to the fact that local police have a comparative
advantage in community policing, the FBI has embarked in the last decade or
so on a number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), in which local police
officers are assigned to work with federal agents to investigate and prevent
acts of terrorism. 267 Such JTTFs merge the resources and intelligence assets

262. See Tracey L. Meares, PrayingforCommunity Policing,90 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 159495 (2002); Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing,90 CAL. L.

REV. 1513, 1513 (2002).
263. See, e.g., Rebecca Davis O'Brien, A Former Teacher Returns to Lead FBI's NYC
Office, WALL
ST.
J.,
Mar.
7, 2015,
at
A13;
FBI Portland History,
https://www.fbi.gov/history/field-office-histories/portland
[https://penna.cc/6KPZ-9Y3K]
("The attacks of September 11 immediately made preventing terrorist attacks the top priority of
the FBI and the Portland Division"); cf GRAFF, supra note 1, at 20, 23-25 (noting that the FBI
has long been engaged in counterterrorism, with the notable post-9/11 shift being an expansion
into global counterterrorism).
264. GRAFF, supra note 1, at 521.
265. Id. This is not to say that federal officials are unable to develop community
relationships; see, e.g., Allan Brettman, Fire at Corvallis Mosque that Portland
Bomb
Plot
Suspect
Attended
Causes
Little
Physical
Damage,
Big
Symbolic Wound, OR. LIVE (Nov. 29, 2010), https://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwestnews/2010/11/fire_atcorvallis_mosquethat portland bomb_plot _suspectattendedcauses_1
ittlejphysical damagebig.html [https://perma.cc/J4AZ-NWFB] (noting that the FBI special
agent in charge and the acting U.S. Attorney "not only visited the scene of [an anti-Muslim
arson] but also delivered a message of support and tolerance to the Islamic center's leaders and
members").
266. See Tung Yin, Joint Terrorism Task Forcesas a Window into the Security vs. Civil

Liberties Debate, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2011).
267. See, e.g., id at 3.
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of federal agents with the regional expertise of the local police; 268 over 100
American cities have entered into JTTFs with the FBI. 269 But JTTFs are not

without downsides. The local law enforcement officers are subsumed within
the task force as federal actors, which can place them in a difficult position if
the JTTF requires them to take actions that satisfy federal law but violate state
law-which can happen if the state happens to provide a greater level of
protection for civil liberties than the U.S. Constitution and federal law do. 270
In 2011, when the city of Portland, Oregon, debated rejoining the JTTF (from

which it had withdrawn in 2005 over concerns about the participating Portland
officers' inability to share everything they learned with the mayor due to the
latter's lack of top secret security clearance), the local chapter of the American
Civil Liberties Union argued that the JTTF could force Portland police
officers to violate a state law prohibiting law enforcement officers from
collecting or maintaining "information about the political, religious or social
views, associations or activities" of anyone absent "reasonable grounds to
suspect the subject of the information is or may be involved in criminal
conduct." 27 1 Because of the Supremacy Clause, federal agents might not be
obligated to comport with this state law and could take the JTTF in a direction
that would violate the law.272 Ultimately, the city decided to rejoin the JTTF
on an as-needed basis-a compromise that seemed to allow city
councilmembers on either side of the debate to believe that they had achieved
their goals. 273 Notably, the mayor explained that his willingness to drop his

prior opposition to rejoining the JTTF stemmed from the change in White
House administration (from President Bush to President Obama). 274 If, on the

other hand, local government officials distrust (or outright oppose) the current
White House, then it is unlikely that a city with concerns such as those that
Portland had in 2005-2011 would be willing to rejoin a JTTF-thereby
depriving federal counterterrorism officials of the expertise of local law
enforcement agencies.275

268. Id. at 4-5.
269. Id. at 3.
270. See id. at 20-21.
271. Id. at 18-20 (citing OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 181A.250 (2017)).
272. Id. at 21.
273. Id. at 22.
274. Id. at 19 (quoting then-Mayor Sam Adams). Another motivating factor besides the
change in Presidency was a highly publicized undercover sting operation in Portland the
previous year, in which FBI agents arrested a young man for plotting to detonate a car bomb at
the city's annual Christmas tree-lighting ceremony. Id. at 18.
275. There are numerous examples of local municipalities that have refused to cooperate
with the Trump Administration due to disagreement with its policies, including the various
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A corollary to the need to maintain strong relationships with relevant
communities is the importance of not focusing on only a few communities as
passive detectors while ignoring other ones from which terrorists might also
emerge. The obvious reason is that ignoring relevant communities is akin to
shutting off passive detectors facing certain directions. For example, the
Government Accountability Office has reported that between September 12,
2001, and December 31, 2016, domestic terrorist incidents perpetrated by

"radical Islamist" attackers killed 119 persons, while those perpetrated by "far
right extremists" killed 106 persons. 276 Former FBI Special Agent Mike

German, who specialized in infiltrating white supremacist groups, has argued
that the United States has focused far too little attention on domestic right
wing terrorist groups due to the overemphasis on the Muslim community. 277

This is not a matter of community policing in all neighborhoods in an effort
to show that law enforcement authorities are not bigots or racists (though there
is something to be said for imposing burdens across the board, as opposed to
singling out a discrete minority group; abusive policing is less likely to be
tolerated when it is conducted on a widespread basis). 278 It is an attempt to
detect potential terrorism in all communities.
Additionally, focusing only on a subset of communities-or a single
community, such as American Muslims-even with seemingly benign
interactions such as community policing or relationship building can backfire.
Saher Aziz has criticized the use of community policing in Muslim
communities for counterterrorism purposes, primarily on the grounds that it

is not true community policing but rather a degenerate version that has coopted local law enforcement into supporting the federal government's

localities that have designated themselves as so-called sanctuary cities for undocumented aliens.
See, e.g., Liz Robbins, Even in a 'Sanctuary City,' Immigrants Risk Being Deported, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2018, at A21; see also Veena Dubal, The Demise of Community Policing? The
Impact ofPost-9/11 FederalSurveillance Programson Local Law Enforcement, 19 ASIAN AM.
L.J. 35, 38 (2012) (arguing that local law enforcement must remain accountable to their
constituents rather than support federal counterterrorism policies at odds with local values).
276. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO DEFINE STRATEGY AND ASSESS PROGRESS OF FEDERAL EFFORTS 3 (2017). This

report has drawn criticism as misleadingly equating the toll of radical Islamist terror with that
of far-right extremists by beginning the period of assessment the day after 9/11, thus seeming to
ignore al Qaeda's 2977 victims. However, the point of the study was not to downplay the threat
posed by radical Islamists, but rather to highlight that posed by another group in light of
counterterrorism steps taken since 9/11.
277. See Mike German, Opinion, What We Don't GetAbout the FarRight, CNN (Nov. 20,
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/20/opinions/what-we-dont-get-about-far-right-violencegerman/index.html [https://perma.cc/2YNP-7RMS].
278. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 160-61 (1997).
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aggressive and adversarial approach. 279 According to Professor Aziz,
community policing in the Muslim community-as currently practiced-

cannot succeed because it forces the victims of civil rights abuses to cooperate
with their abusers. 2 0 Community policing in this context ends up leveraging
members of the Muslim community into spying on their neighbors and
friends. 281 Amna Akbar is similarly skeptical of community policing in the
counterterrorism context, contending that the end result is to "provid[e] police
with greater power and discretion over marginalized communities." 282 It is
merely an observation that policing resources-including community
outreach efforts-should be expended in some general proportion to the scope
of the threat that the community may be able to assist in preventing. 283
The concerns that Professors Aziz and Akbar raise about the actual effect
of community policing and counterterrorism cannot be dismissed. The
concerns go to both the efficacy as well as the morality of the government's
practices. Singling out the Muslim community alone for community policing
and relationship building in the name of counterterrorism cannot help but
create the false impression that only Muslims are terrorists. 284 That false
impression in turn can bias law enforcement, counterterrorism agents, and the
public toward immediately suspecting the Muslim community whenever there
is an apparent act of terrorism, which in turn can reinforce investigative efforts
on that particular community. 285 The problem is exacerbated by the fact that
the media and government have often been quicker to label alleged
perpetrators of mass killings as "terrorists" when they are Muslims (or of Arab
descent) than when they are not.286 And perhaps not surprisingly, an empirical
study by Tom Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer, and Aziz Huq of Muslim

communities in parts of New York City concluded that the perception of
fairness (i.e., procedural justice) of how counterterrorism policies were
carried out was positively correlated with willingness to cooperate and to

279.
280.
281.
282.
(2015).

See Aziz, supra note 11, at 156-57.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 186-87.
Amna Akbar, National Security's Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. 834, 845
&

283. See generally DAVID SCHANZER ET AL., TRIANGLE CTR. ON TERRORISM
HOMELAND SEC., THE CHALLENGE AND PROMISE OF USING COMMUNITY POLICING

STRATEGIES TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM, at i-iv (2016) (noting that communities
respond to policing differently).
284. See Yin, supra note 84, at 59.
285. See id at 61.
286. See id. at 69 (comparing media labeling of analogously situated Muslim and nonMuslim mass shooters and bombers).
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report suspected terrorists, while the perception of having been discriminated
against was negatively correlated with such willingness. 287 What is
remarkable about this study is that it determined that the positive and negative
effects of perception were better able to predict willingness to cooperate with
authorities than the traditional deterrence-based rational expectations
analysis. 288 A more recent study corroborated the findings of the Tyler study,
with various respondents reporting perceptions of being singled out for
unequal scrutiny. 28 9
2.

Passive CoherentLocation (andElectronicSurveillance)

Passive coherent location, which relies on detection of active signals
emitted by the target, 290 can be analogized to reading social media and other
forms of public communications as well as electronic surveillance of the
contents of potential targets' e-mails and phone conversations. It can also be
analogized to monitoring lawful activities that nevertheless might be
precursors of potential terrorism, such as buying quantities of materials
consistent with bomb making as opposed to legitimate uses.
These forms of detection are passive because the counterterrorism agents
are simply reading or listening to what the surveillance target is broadcasting
or doing without taking any actions that would be observable or noticeable by
the target. (Note that it is technologically possible to track the IP addressesand hence domains-of visitors to particular websites, 291 so reading blog posts
might not perfectly analogous to passive coherent location. Still, government
agents who are monitoring public social media and other communications can
take steps to mask their domains by using virtual private networks or taking
other steps to anonymize their Internet presence).

For the purposes of the analogy, it does not matter that some
communications (such as e-mails and phone conversations) are not intended
for public consumption, as opposed to social media posts, published writings,
or public interviews; the same may well be true of the electronic signals and

287. Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy andDeterrenceEffects in CounterterrorismPolicing:
A Study ofMuslim Americans, 44 L. & SOC'Y REV. 365, 368-69 (2010).
288. Id.
289. SCHANZER ET AL., supra note 283, at 19-20.
290. See Steadman, supra note 129.
291. See Adam Tanner, Here are Some Companies Who Unmask Anonymous Web Visitors

(And
Why
They
Do
It),
FORBES
(July
1,
2013),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/2013/07/0 1/heres-some-companies-who-unmaskanonymous-web-visitors-and-why-they-do-it/#4465b59f4115 [https://penna.cc/6QHA-3XUB].
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other information picked up by passive detectors in information warfare. Of
course, the private nature of a communication is relevant from a legal
standpoint, for it would mean that the speaker or writer likely had a reasonable
expectation of privacy; thus, interception of the communication would
constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. 292 But in this context,

that just means certain types of passive detection would require advance
judicial approval. The distinction between passive and active detection is
based not on legal requirements but on technological capabilities.
This sort of passive detection has the advantage of drawing information
directly from the suspected enemy target, especially where it consists of
interception of electronic transmissions. Reading social media postings by

suspected terrorists crosses over as an analogy from passive detection to
interception of enemy communications, but still counts as a tactic aimed at
detecting and identifying terrorists.
As with passive detection, military use of passive coherent location has
limitations as an analogy to counterterrorism. During war time-at least, in
traditional nation-state armed conflicts-active signals themselves may be an
indication of potential enemy activity, particularly where the opposing sides

have territorial integrity such that the enemy can be expected to attack from
certain directions. 293 Domestic counterterrorism does not fit neatly within this
paradigm; and thus, passive coherent location in such circumstances would
entail the interception of vast amounts of signals from potential hostiles as
well as nonhostiles.
When it comes to interception of enemy or adversary military
communications, the U.S. government need not worry about the requirements
and prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment; 294 all enemy communications are
fair game for interception. 295 Left to its own devices during wartime, the
government would intercept and attempt to read any communications
potentially from the enemy. If anything were to keep the government from
realizing this goal, it would be the sheer volume of messages and the

292. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). Wiretapping of phone lines or
electronic surveillance of e-mails would generally require that government agents obtain a
warrant, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-18 (2018).
293. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶4.
294. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990) (holding that
Fourth Amendment protections did not apply to government conduct in Mexico directed against
a non-resident alien); see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950) (holding
that non-resident aliens facing military trials in Germany could not seek redress in federal court).
295. See JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA-SECRET NSA FROM
9/11 TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA 1-3 (2008).
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encryption protecting those messages. 296 Even after the British and Americans

managed to crack the German Enigma and Japanese Magic codes, decryption
did not occur in real time because, each day, the German and Japanese military
changed the daily code inputs; the Allied cryptanalysts needed to deduce those
inputs before they could resume decrypting intercepted messages. 297
Relatedly, the 9/11 Commission's investigation of the terrorist attacks
revealed that the National Security Agency had intercepted a message on
September 10, 2001, stating "[T]omorrow is zero hour"; however, the
message was not translated from Arabic until two days later. 2 98

Interception of more communications or signals is, therefore, not always
better, because there is a finite limitation to how much information the
government can process effectively and in a timely fashion. The National
Security Agency (NSA) has been aware of the technological challenges
involved in decrypting and analyzing massive amounts of voice and data. 299
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the NSA was building enormous

buildings to house the supercomputers and data storage banks needed to
process all of the information that the agency was accumulating. 300
Another limiting factor besides computing (i.e., decryption) power is the
finite number of federal judges, who are needed to issue electronic
surveillance warrants.30' Moreover, unless the counterterrorism agents
already can demonstrate probable cause to believe that the target "is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense," 30 2
they will need to proceed under the FISA, 303 where the standard-probable

-

cause to believe that the target of the search is an agent of a foreign power 304
may be easier to satisfy.305 Only judges on the FISA court can issue FISA
warrants-and there are only eleven FISA judges at any given time. 306 As a

296. On the challenge of decrypting encrypted messages, see supra notes 104-120 and
accompanying text.
297. KAHN, supra note 110, at 587-88.
298. Walter Pincus & Dana Priest, NSA Interceptson Eve of9/11 Sent a Warning, WASH.
POST, June 20, 2002, at A01.
299. See BAMFORD, supra note 295, at 2.
300. Id. at 3.
301. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1) (2012).
302. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2018).
303. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1).
304. Id. § 1805(a)(2(A).
305. In fact, this very concern led the Clinton Justice Department to adopt a "wall" to
"regulate[] the manner in which [foreign intelligence] information could be shared from the
intelligence side of the house to the criminal side." THE 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16,
at 79.
306. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1).
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further bottleneck, FISA requires the Attorney General's signature on every
warrant application.30 7
3.

Active Detection

In contrast to passive detection, active detection systems send out directed
electromagnetic waves of their own and then interpret the interference of other
objects with those same waves.3 08 By analogy, passive counterterrorism is
made up of surreptitious surveillance and monitoring, while active
counterterrorism involves interaction by government agents within the
relevant community, particularly with the one or more targets. 309 The
interaction can range from consensual interviews of the target to undercover
operations where an agent or informant pretends to be an extremist seeking to
ally with the target.310 Strictly speaking, though, such direct interaction is not
really analogous to the use of active radar or sonar because it would typically
focus on individuals who came to the attention of the counterterrorism agents
through other means, such as the passive detection forms discussed above.
Compared to the passive detection methods, direct interaction provides
the government with a better opportunity to refine its assessment of a target's
intentions because the agents can adjust their operation in reaction to the
target's responses. The potential for more accurate assessment of a target's

intentions is not, however, without possible downsides. If the target is indeed
intent on committing a terrorist act, direct interaction of any type may change

his or her behavior. In this context, it might mean alerting the target that law
enforcement

authorities

are suspicious.

The target might respond by

abandoning the planned act of terrorism, which might be considered a solid
victory if the abandonment is permanent but only a mixed one if it is
temporary; or the target might accelerate the act of terrorism, improvising if
necessary. The leader of the New York subway bombing plot, Najibullah
Zazi, discarded his explosive material when he learned from his father that

307. Id. § 1804(a).
308. SKOLNIK, supra note 123, at 1-2.
309. Compare Temple-Raston, supra note 87 (utilizing surveillance and wiretaps to
monitor targets), with Ian Cummings, FBI Undercover Stings Foil TerroristPlots but Often
Plots of the Agency's
Own Making, KAN.
CITY
STAR (Mar. 2, 2017),
https://www.kansascity.com/news/local/crime/articlel35871988.html
(contacting potential
targets via social media to activate sting operations).
310. See, e.g., Larry Lazo et al., CourtPapersShow MarylandBomb PlotSuspect Spooked
by
Oregon
Sting,
CNN
(Dec.
9,
2010,
5:22
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/12/08/maryland.plot/index.html [https://perna.cc/3HWCVPU4].
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New York police officers had questioned a Muslim cleric about him. 311 A
codefendant, Adis Medunjanin, on the other hand, when confronted by a
search warrant, reacted by driving away and trying to crash his car on a
crowded freeway.3 12
While deception operations such as undercover stings do not run the same
risk of directly alerting would-be terrorists that they might be dealing with a
government operative, the fact that such stings have been disclosed publicly
(both in government press releases and media accounts)313 nevertheless may
alert a perspicacious target that he or she is being ensnared in a law
enforcement scheme. For example, the FBI's arrest of Mohamed Mohamud
on November 26, 2010, for attempting to bomb a Christmas tree lighting
ceremony in Portland, Oregon, resulted in national news coverage.3 14 One
person who caught wind of the news coverage was Antonio Martinez, who at
that very instant was plotting with two others (one an informant, the other an
undercover agent) to bomb a military recruiting station in Maryland.3 15
Martinez reportedly told the informant that "he needed to know 'who this
brother [i.e., the undercover agent] is. . . . I'm not falling for no b.s."' 316 In the
end, Martinez did fall for the sting operation-but with awareness of the
possibility that he was dealing with government operatives. 31 7
Continued and (relatively) widespread use of undercover sting operations
may therefore seem analogous to active detection in that they provide the user
with the opportunity to zero in on a particular target, but they may also tip that

target off that someone is testing him or her. In wartime, this double-edged
nature of active detection means that it must be used carefully, if at all, in

311. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to
Use Explosives Against Persons or Property in U.S., Conspiracy to Murder Abroad, and
Providing
Material
Support
to
al
Qaeda
(Feb
22,
2010),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/najibullah-zazi-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-use-explosivesagainst-persons-or-property-us [https://penna.cc/SFU2-G5DP].
312. See William K. Rashbaum, F.B.I. Seizes Passportof Queens Man Scrutinizedin Plot,
N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 8, 2010, at A22.
313. See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 309; Press Release, U.S. Att'ys Office N. Dist. of
Ohio, Five Men Arrested in Plot to Bomb Ohio Bridge (May 1, 2012),
https://arwhives.fbi.gov/archives/cleveland/press-releases/20 12/five-men-arrested-in-plot-tobomb-ohio-bridge; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Foreign Nationals Charged with
Attempting to Provide Material Support to Terrorists and Alien Smuggling (Jan. 27, 2006),
https://arwhives.fbi.gov/archives/cleveland/press-releases/20 12/five-men-arrested-in-plot-tobomb-ohio-bridge [https://penna.cc/J94P-3A9Z].
314. See Yin, supra note 84, at 44-45.
315. Lazo, supra note 310.
316. Id.
317. Id.
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situations calling for stealth and secrecy, lest the user give away its location.
Although the stakes of counterterrorism are high-potentially life or deaththe consequences of giving away the fact that there was an active
counterterrorism operation are not necessarily as dire as those in wartime but
might lead to accelerated execution of terrorist plots that, even if incomplete
in their planning, could still cause death and destruction.
B.

Determining the Intentions of PotentialTerrorists

Once soldiers in open armed conflicts have detected and identified
opposition forces, they generally need not ascertain the intentions of those
enemy forces before attacking.3 18 Traditional armed forces can be attacked
even if they are not engaged in hostilities at that moment because the laws of
war predicate eligibility for being attacked on combatant status, not on actual
intent to fight. 319 Counterterrorism agents, on the other hand, stand in a
different position; for them, surveillance, community tips, and online
monitoring cannot always provide a clear indication of whether the target is
in fact intent on carrying out a mass attack. Community members who provide
tips might be mistaken or, worse yet, might be trying to cause trouble for the
suspect. Online statements might sound alarming, but the writer might simply

be venting with no intention of carrying out an actual attack. Unlike the
soldier, the counterterrorism agent cannot identify an antagonist by uniform
or other fixed sign, and thus cannot "attack" (i.e., arrest) such a suspect absent
probable cause to believe that a crime is being or will be committed.
Yet many of the mass shooters and bombers discussed earlier in this
Article did give warning signs that they were dangerous and potentially
violent. 320 In the aftermath of a mass shooting (or bombing), there were a
number of questions raised about whether something could have been done to
prevent the attack. For example, after Jared Loughner's shooting rampage

killed six and wounded fourteen others, Time Magazine asked: "[C]ould
anything have been done to prevent the violence? What signs that trouble lay
ahead were missed? What signs were observed but ignored? In short, what

318. See PICTET, supra note 78, at 46-48 (quoting 1907 Hague Regulations, Annex to
the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 623).
319. See id. (quoting 1907 Hague Regulations, Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV)
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539,
623).
320. See supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text.
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can be done to prevent a potentially ill or unstable person from harming
others?" 32 1
In March 2018, the U.S Secret Service National Threat Assessment

Center released a report that analyzed twenty-eight mass attacks occurring in
2017 in public places in the United States, concluding that 79% of the
attackers had "engaged in communications or exhibited behaviors that caused
concern in others."3 22 The concerns resulted in a variety of responses ranging
from complaints to employers or law enforcement, to firing the person, to
avoiding him altogether,3 23 but notably not detention, since all the suspects
were at liberty to carry out their deadly attacks.3 24
Hindsight tells us that the red flags in those three cases indeed
foreshadowed their violent actions, but there is no doubt red flags were raised
involving many other persons who did not act out violently. Not only would
it be infeasible to detain every person who flashes signs of dangerousness, but
also it would result in the unreasonable detention of numerous persons who
should not be detained. Indeed, a "finding of dangerousness, standing alone,
is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite

involuntary commitment."3 25 There must be some kind of mental illness or
abnormality in addition to the dangerousness to justify civil commitment.3 26
Rather, the lesson is that we need some approach for determining which
persons raising red flags in fact pose real dangers to society. Further

monitoring of the suspect might resolve the uncertainty over the suspect's
intentions, but definitive resolution is more likely to occur in the direction of
confirming intent to commit terrorist acts than refuting such intent. This is
true because activity that goes beyond speech into the realm of preparationsuch as acquiring weapons or precursor material for homemade bombsrequire the suspect to take affinrmative steps that are distinctively separate from
mere speech.3 27 By contrast, failure to take any affirmative steps toward
preparation of an actual attack is consistent not only with lack of intention but
also with intent to attack without being ready to do so yet.

321. Kate Pickert & John Cloud, If You Think Someone Is Mentally Ill: Loughner's Six
Warning Signs, TIME, Jan. 11, 2011.
322. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. SECRET SERV., NAT'L THREAT ASSESSMENT
CTR., MASS ATTACKS IN PUBLIC SPACES - 2017, at 1, 6 (2018).

323. Id. at 6.
324. See Pickert & Cloud, supra note 321 ("In most states, including Arizona, it's
predictably difficult to detain someone involuntarily due to mental illness").
325. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
326. Id.
327. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2018) (establishing an overt act in furtherance of an unlawful
agreement as an element of criminal conspiracy).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol71/iss2/10

52

Yin: An Information Operations Theory of Domestic Counterterrorism Eff
2019]

INFORMATION

OPERATIONS

THEORY

575

Counterterrorism agents may find themselves facing a similar situation to
that which Detective McFadden of Terry v. Ohio found himself-namely,
having suspicions about what certain individuals were up to but not having
probable cause to arrest.3 28 McFadden observed three people possibly casing
a store for a later burglary attempt.3 29 Lacking probable cause to arrest, he
approached the trio for a not entirely consensual encounter, which resulted in
the discovery of a handgun on Terry, leading to the arrest of all three.330 The
Supreme Court approved the "stop-and-frisk." 331 The result of the stop-andfrisk should be either that the officer develops probable cause from the
responses given by the suspect (or from evidence seized during the frisk), or
the reasonable suspicion is dissipated because the suspect's answers satisfy
the officer that there is no criminal activity taking place.33 2 Terry is admittedly
an imperfect analogy because the stop-and-frisk encounter is not voluntary
and it requires that the officer have reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.333 However, it demonstrates that the legal regime contemplates direct
interaction as an alternative to observing and waiting.
Thus, instead of relying on further surveillance and monitoring,
government agents might seek to expedite their assessment of the suspect's
intentions through direct interactions with the suspect (i.e., the
counterterrorism equivalent of active detection)-such as overt interviews or
undercover sting operations. An interview might dispel the agents' suspicions
about the target, or it might intensify those suspicions, and possibly even
provide a basis for arresting the person.33 4
The undercover sting operation has a number of advantages in this regard.
In a typical undercover sting operation, one or more law enforcement officers
conceal their true status and instead assume a criminal persona in order to
assess whether the target has similar criminal intentions.335 Undercover police
officers have thus pretended to be illegal drug buyers or sellers, men in search

328. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 7-8, 22 (1968).
329. Id. at 6.
330. Id. at 6-7.
331. Id. at 10, 29-30.
332. See id at 28.
333. Id. at 30.
334. Cf Bowden, supra note 177 (discussing how a New York homicide detective
managed to get a suspect to give "him three voluntary statements in a single day, each one
signed, each one different, each one slightly closer to the truth"); see also Stansbury v.
California, 511 U.S. 318, 320 (1994) (discussing a situation where suspect voluntarily appeared
at police station and proceeded to incriminate himself).
335. GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 7, 52 (1988).
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of prostitutes, prostitutes, or sellers or fences of stolen property.336 When a
person attempts to engage in the unlawful transaction, he finds himself
arrested.
Political corruption is another area in which undercover sting operations
have been used to secure criminal convictions. 337 Like vice crimes, bribery is
an activity defined by law as an offense but one where the participants are
voluntarily and consensually engaged.338 In the late 1970s, the FBI initiated
an undercover sting operation to investigate potential bribery of U.S.
congresspersons. 339 Known as ABSCAM, the two-year operation involved an

FBI agent posing as a wealthy Arab sheikh, assisted by a con artist, who
ultimately caught a U.S. senator, several U.S. representatives, and other public
officials such as mayors and city councilmembers accepting fictitious
bribes.34 0 The FBI also used undercover operations to investigate violent

criminals, beginning with Joseph Pistone's infiltration of the Mafia in the late
1970s. 34 ' For six years, Pistone (known as Donnie Brasco) played an expert

jewel thief who worked his way into a mob family, eventually reaching the
position where he was ready to be sponsored for full membership. 342 As a
result of Pistone's undercover work, the federal government indicted
hundreds of Mafia members and convicted over 100 of them.3 43 Not
surprisingly, law enforcement agencies began to use undercover agents to

infiltrate domestic terrorism gangs (often white supremacists) well before
9/11.344

336. The possibility of undercover operatives 'stinging' each other on opposite sides of an
illegal transaction is not unheard of. Id. at 173-75 (recounting numerous instances of undercover
law enforcement agents trying to arrest other undercover law enforcement agents).
337. Id. at 42.
338. Howard J. Alperin, Annotation, Elements ofOffense Proscribed by the HobbsAct (18
US.CA. § 1951) Against Racketeering in Interstate or Foreign Commerce, 4 A.L.R. Fed 881
§ 6[fI (1970). On the other hand, where a political official demands an "underthe table" payment

in exchange for an official favor, and the other party complies out of fear that the official would
otherwise retaliate, we would describe the crime as extortion. Id.
339. See generally ROBERT W. GREENE, THE STING MAN: INSIDE ABSCAM (1981).
340. See, e.g., id at 5-11.
341. Pistone recounted his experiences in JOSEPH D. PISTONE WITH RICHARD WOODLEY,
DONNIE BRASCO: MY UNDERCOVER LIFE IN THE MAFIA 27 (1988).

342. Id. at 31-33. To gain full membership, Pistone would have had to murder someone
targeted by the mob family, although he believed he could have avoided actually doing so, and
that his sponsor would have lied to cover for him. See id at 323, 346-47. The FBI believed that
the undercover operation was becoming too dangerous for Pistone and set an end date. Id. at
348.
343. JOSEPH D. PISTONE & CHARLES BRANDT, DONNIE BRASCO: UNFINISHED BUSINESS

33 (2008).
344. See, e.g., GERMAN, supra note 38, at 3-4, 19-23.
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If the target of the terrorism sting operation definitively refuses to propose
criminal activity, then there may be a basis for concluding that he poses little
to no threat.3 45 If, on the other hand, the target of the sting reveals his criminal
intentions by proposing some violent plan, then the undercover operation can
generate evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
attempted to engage in a terrorist attack-and hence, provide a legal
justification for incapacitating that person.
To be sure, critics of terrorism sting operations have disputed the
significance of this conclusion on the ground that government agents
entrapped (i.e., manipulated) the target into the end result.3 46 The fact that a
target intentionally tried to detonate a bomb at the end of the sting operation
does not, it is true, prove that the target initially had such an intention before
the sting operation commenced. However, the entrapment defense in theory,
or at least in practice, exists to ensure that terrorism defendants convicted after
sting operations were "predisposed" to commit acts of terror. 347

A full-scale analysis of the entrapment defense is beyond the scope of this
Article, but it is worth noting how entrapment does not fall neatly within the
information operations analogy. In federal courts, entrapment focuses on the
subjective mindset of the defendant. 348 The objective conduct of the
government agents is typically not relevant, because the predisposition

question goes to the defendant's mindset before interaction with the
government.349 Thus, in Jacobson v. United States-the Supreme Court's

most recent decision on the doctrine-the government inundated the
defendant for two years with offers to sell child pornography, at the end of
which the defendant ended up trying to buy some. 35 0 The Court did not dispute

345. See, e.g., MARX, supra note 335, at 93. There is, of course, the possibility that the
target either is very clever and wary of being caught in a sting operation or prefers to work alone.
See e.g., id. at 72.
346. See, e.g., AARONSON, supra note 239, at 226; Glenn Greenwald, The FBI Again
Thwarts
Its
Own
Terror
Plot,
SALON
(Sept.
29,
2011),
https://www.salon.com/2011/09/29/fbi_terror/ [https://perma.cc/RRX2-25XP] ("[I]n order to
justify this Endless War on civil liberties (and Terror) the FBI has to search for [young male
Muslims] . . . they can recruit, convince, and direct to carry out plots.").
347. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 540 (1992) (requiring the prosecution,
when entrapment is raised as a defense, to prove that the defendant was predisposed independent
of government attention to commit the charged crime).
348. See PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 36-39 (2d ed. 1995).

349. See generallyid. at 38-40. (explaining that a minority of state courts use the objective
test, focusing on the reasonableness of the conduct of the government agents). Some scholars
have argued that in practice, there is no difference between the two approaches. See Ronald J.
Allen et al., ClarifyingEntrapment, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 409 (1999).
350. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 540.
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that the defendant became predisposed to acquire child pornography after the
two year campaign, concluding that the defendant was not predisposed at the
beginning of the campaign-and thus he had been entrapped.3 51
Entrapment thus tests whether the defendant would have been willing to
carry out this planned attack without any coercion by the government. 52 This
is an important question because there is a moral appeal to the proposition that
the government should not be manufacturing crimes.3 53 However, the
proposition should perhaps be restated as the government should not be
manufacturing crimes that would not otherwise occur if the target were left

alone. The critical distinction between the originally stated proposition and
the modified one is that the latter contemplates that, even if never approached
by the government, the target might still attempt to engage in an act of

terrorism if approached and persuaded by other persons intent on carrying out
such an attack.3 54 This modified proposition can be justified on the ground
that if the target is malleable enough to agree to a terrorist plot with
undercover agents, then he is malleable enough to agree to a terrorist plot with
actual terrorists-so long, of course, as there are such actual terrorists capable
of such recruitment.
C.

Deception and Confusion Operations

Besides gathering information about the enemy, information operations
are also about confusing or deceiving the enemy. Electronic jamming systems
can overwhelm radars, and false information can be leaked to trick the enemy
into acting in a certain way or not to act. 355 Many counterterrorism activities

such as electronic surveillance take place and, hence, would be unlikely to
confuse or deceive the target, but undercover stings can deceive as well as
confuse potential targets.
The deception element is obvious: the undercover agent pretends to be a
fellow terrorist but, in reality, is a law enforcement officer, a fact that, if
known, would cause the target to avoid the agent. As a result, the target is
tricked (or induced) into revealing that he would carry out a terrorist attack if

351. Id. at 553.
352. See AARONSON, supra note 239, at 197.
353. See, e.g., id. at 16-17.
354. Cf Jessica A. Roth, The Anomaly of Entrapment, 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 979, 982
(2014) (discussing the government's justification "that law enforcement and the real terrorists
are competing to find those who would be willing to join the terrorist cause").
355. SCOTT GERWEHR & RUSSELL W. GLENN, THE ART OF DARKNESS: DECEPTION AND
URBAN OPERATIONS 25 (2000).
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he had the means to do so. The effect of the sting (though not necessarily the
mechanism) is similar to that of the Midway ruse, which tricked the Imperial
Japanese Navy into revealing that Midway Island was its target.35 6

There is an important distinction between wartime information operations
and counterterrorism when it comes to the certainty that the target of the
deception is in fact the enemy. The Midway ruse not only was directed at the
Japanese Navy but also would not have deceived any Americans because, in
that theater of war, only the Japanese Navy would have been seeking
information about the conditions on Midway Island.35 7 With an undercover
sting operation, on the other hand, one goal may be to deceive or trick the
target, but another goal-as discussed earlier-is to determine whether the
target is actually a would-be terrorist. This means that the sting operation, if
improperly executed, may end up deceiving someone who did not pose an
actual threat of becoming a terrorist before the government interaction.
With respect to confusion, domestic sting operations can, to the extent
their existence is known publicly, jam the "signals" of actual terrorists in a
similar way to how electronic jammers overwhelm detectors by flooding the
airspace with electromagnetic radiation. 358 Someone looking to engage in
domestic terrorism who happens to find seemingly like-minded individuals
must now ponder whether he is dealing with true terrorists or with government

agents. 359 As a result, a concerned target may back out of what would be an
actual (i.e., not a sting) operation or, even if deciding to take part in an
operation, may spend time and effort trying to determine whether the coconspirators are government agents. For example, in other criminal contexts,

drug dealers may abandon sales that would otherwise have been made out of
fear that the buyers were undercover agents; similarly, prostitutes may forego
sexual encounters.3 60 By sapping the concentration of criminals and forcing

356. Mark Munson, The Battle ofMidway: The Complete Intelligence Story, WAR ON THE
ROCKS (June 3, 2016), https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/the-battle-of-midway-the-completeintelligence-story/ [https://perma.cc/AN3E-6653].
357. Id.
358. See P. Anjaneyulu et al., A Mini Review on Radar Fundamentals and Concept of
Jamming, 8 INT'L J. ADVANCED RESEARCH IN COMPUTER SC. 763, 765 (2017).
359. See, e.g., Samuel J. Rascoff, Counterterrorismand New Deterrence, 89 N.Y.U. L.

REv. 830, 854 (2014) (quoting Julian Sanchez, Why Sting?, JULIAN SANCHEZ (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://www.juliansanchez.com/2011/09/30/why-sting/ [https://perma.cc/E8H2-GL4P]) ("[T]he
steady stream of news reports will eventually force any candidate for jihad to assume that an 'Al
Qaeda recruiter' who approaches them is much more likely to be an FBI informant orundercover
agent than a genuine operative."); see AARONSON, supra note 239, at 29-30.
360. See, e.g., MARX, supra note 335, at 76 (noting how in some cities, prostitutes would
not propose sexual transactions but would instead wait for the johns to do so, under the belief
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them to spend time monitoring one another, undercover operations deter some
criminal activity and undermine the success of other activity. This is one of
the normative arguments in support of American conspiracy law, that it

"disrupt[s] trust and social order within the conspiracy." 361
Interestingly, the confusion aspect of sting operations conflicts directly
with the active detection aspect of it. Greater public awareness of undercover
sting operations means that targets may be more guarded than they otherwise
would be, and thus might successfully conceal their terrorist intentions by not
falling for the stings. At the same time, greater public awareness of undercover
stings may make potential terrorists more paranoid about everyone they deal
with and, hence, less likely to engage in coordinated terrorism with others.
VI. LESSONS

FROM

THE

UNDERCOVER STING

INFORMATION

OPERATIONS

ANALOGY

FOR

OPERATIONS

Undercover law enforcement operations have been in existence long
enough that the basic arguments for and against them have been welldeveloped. Supporters of undercover operations argue that, without them,
certain types of crimes would escape detection and prosecution. 362 The vice
crimes that were traditionally the target of undercover operations typically had
no victims, at least not in the traditional sense of someone who was
unwillingly harmed physically or financially, because the transaction between
buyer and seller was consensual. 363 Of course, rampant drug sales or
prostitution in a neighborhood may depress property values or spur local
property crimes, thereby harming the residents of the area. This sort of harm
has been described by the Supreme Court as "secondary effects." 364 If these
secondary effects are severe enough, then local residents may be motivated to

that undercover agents were prohibited from doing so). But see id. at 123-24 (discussing
research studies finding no deterrent effect from sting operations).
361. Neal Kumar Katyal, ConspiracyTheory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1346 (2003).
362. See, e.g., MARX, supra note 335, at 118-19, 124-25.
363. Id. at 7. Of course, not all sex workers may have chosen their line of work freely of
their own will. Sex trafficking remains a serious problem in the United States and is separate
criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2018) (criminalizing sex trafficking of minors); 18
U.S.C. § 1590 (2018) (criminalizing trafficking in general). Also, one who has voluntarily
chosen to become a prostitute does not give up the right to choose to withhold consent for sex.
See Hagins v. United States, 639 A.2d 612, 616 (D.C. 1994) (quoting Brewer v. United States,
559 A.2d 317, 320 (D.C. 1989).
364. See City ofRenton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986).
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complain to the police. Short of that, however, such crimes may go
undiscovered.3 65

On the other hand, opponents respond that undercover operations entail
the manufacturing of crimes by the police. 366 As the Supreme Court has noted,
"[T]he function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime and the
apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function does not include the
manufacturing of crime." 367 Whether viewed as a due process violation of a
moral outrage, it does seem problematic if apparent criminal conduct occurs
only because police officers are instigating it. That may burnish arrest and
conviction statistics, but it does not make the community safer. However, the
line between crime prevention or apprehension and crime manufacturing is
often blurry where the undercover agent must do more than be a simple
purveyor or buyer of illegal goods or services. The entrapment defense arose
as a means of guarding against government overreach.

One important point about the entrapment defense is that it is not a
constitutional requirement. 368 The Supreme Court case that established the
defense as a matter of federal law, Sorrells v. United States,3 69 did so through

statutory interpretation of legislative intent, reasoning that Congress could not
have intended to enable law enforcement officials to abuse their power by
"lur[ing]" innocent persons to commit crime.3 70 As a consequence, state

courts are not required to follow the federal version of the entrapment defense
if they interpret their criminal statutes differently, and in fact, some states have
opted for objective approaches that focus on the conduct of the law
enforcement officers, rather than the defendant's mindset.3 71
A.

Undercover Operationsin Non-Law Enforcement Contexts

Undercover operations have not been limited to law enforcement agents.
Journalists, activist muckrakers, corporate businesses, housing and

365. Even critics of the entrapment doctrine have conceded that some undercover
operations may be necessary to detect victimless crimes. E.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423, 445 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
366. Shermanv. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
367. Id.; see also Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("The Government may set decoys to entrap criminals. But it may not provoke or
create a crime and then punish the criminal, its creature.").
368. See MARCUS, supra note 348, at 38.
369. Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
370. Id. at 446-48 ("Literal interpretation of statutes at the expense of the reason of the
law and producing absurd consequences or flagrant injustice has frequently been condemned.").
371. See MARCUS, supra note 348, at 38-39.
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employment discrimination testers, and airport security agents, among others,

have conducted investigations while concealing their true identities and goals
from their targets.3 72 Because these actors typically lack the arrest powers that
law enforcement agents possess, 373 the direct result of the investigation is not
prosecution; nevertheless, the general goal of exposing unknown misconduct
or wrongdoing is similar.
One type of non-law enforcement undercover work is performed by
covert "testers" who purport to apply for housing or employment but whose

true interest lies in determining whether the targeted landlord or employer
discriminates against minorities or other disfavored persons.3 74 In evaluating
whether housing discrimination exists, for example, the testing agency might
send two "applicants"-one white and one African-American-with identical
financial backgrounds, job histories, and references to see whether they are
treated similarly by landlords.3 75 The white tester serves as the control; if the
landlord offers a unit to the white tester but not to the African-American one,
one could reasonably suspect racial discrimination as the cause of the
disparate treatment.376 The African-American testers have no actual interest
in renting the apartment, a fact that, if known, would provide a clear reason
for the landlord to reject the rental application. 377 Very similar to housing and
employment testers are "secret shoppers," who pretend to be customers with
the secret goal of evaluating the service, appearance, and other relevant

372. See, e.g., UNIV. OF IOWA CLINICAL LAW PROGRAMS, THE USE OF UNDERCOVER
TESTERS TO IDENTIFY AND ELIMINATE DISCRIMINATION IN THE SELECTION AND HIRING OF

EMPLOYEES (2010); Ashley Halsey, III & Missy Ryan, Secret Observation ofAir Travelers'
Behavior Began in 2010, WASH. POST, July 31, 2018, at A3; Fair Housing Enforcement
Organizations Use Testing to Expose Discrimination, EVIDENCE MATTERS, Spring-Summer

2014,
at
16
[hereinafter
Fair Housing];
Muckrakers,
U.S.
HISTORY,
http://www.uslhistory.org/us/42b.asp [https://perma.cc/T43K-7XJU].
373. The federal government gives the power to arrest to multiple different agencies, but
that authority does not extend to the actors listed above. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3041, 3051-53,
3056, 3056A, 3062 (2018).
374. See, e.g., FairHousing, supra note 372, at 18.
375. See, e.g., id.
376. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 368 (1982).
377. Notwithstanding their lack of actual interest in renting, the Supreme Court held that
such testers do have legal standing to sue landlords who falsely tell them that no units are
available. See id at 373-75 ("That the tester may have approached the real estate agent fully
expecting that he would receive false information, and without any intention of buying or renting
a home, does not negate the simple fact of injury."). There are, of course, alternatives to covert
testing for determining housing or employment discrimination. In the employment context, Title
VII allows employment discrimination plaintiffs to use statistical data to prove that a particular
employment practice has a disparate impact on a protected class. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
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business factors of stores and restaurants.3 78 By keeping their status as an
evaluator secret, they avoid having the store or restaurant provide unusual and
exceptional service so as to secure a favorable review. 379
Some government agencies that do not typically investigate and interdict
criminal activity also engage in undercover operations. 380 The Department of

Homeland Security (DHS), for example, tests the effectiveness of its airport
security personnel by attempting to sneak forbidden items such as firearms
through security checkpoints. 38' Like restaurant reviewers, a DHS official
who overtly announced his or her status would render the test of security
procedures totally worthless.
Journalists have had a history of disguising their identities in order to gain
access to explosive stories, dating back at least to 1887 when Nellie Bly
published an account of her feigned insanity and stay in Blackwell's Island
Insane Asylum, exposing the awful conditions within.3 82 It is difficult to
believe that Bly could have written the same story through reliance on direct
face-to-face interviews with the asylum administrators.
In the 1970s, the Chicago Sun-Times secretly purchased a Chicago bar

named the Mirage Tavern, which it then operated as a private
establishment.383 As a result, the paper was able to publish a series of articles
detailing the rampant corruption among Chicago city inspectors soliciting

378. See, e.g., Laura Blinkhorn, Secret Shoppers and Conflicts of Interest, 15 AMA J.
ETHICS 119, 119 (2013).
379. This is also why restaurant critics should not identify themselves as food critics when
eating at a restaurant for the purpose of reviewing it. See, e.g., Desnick v. Am. Broad. Co., 44
F.3d 1345, 1351 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that without the concept of "deemed consent" where
some people can conceal their intentions, "a restaurant critic could not conceal his identity when
he ordered a meal, or a browser pretend to be interested in merchandise that he could not afford
to buy"); see also Robert Sietsema, Everyone Eats . . But That Doesn't Make You a Critic,
COLUM.
JOURNALISM
REV.,
Jan.-Feb.
2010,
https://archives.cjr.org/feature/everyoneeats.php [https://perma.cc/L4Z2-67S4].
380. See Eric Lichtblau & William M. Arkin, More Agencies Are Using Undercover
Operations,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2014, at Ni.
381. See Michael Goldstein, TSA Misses 70% of Fake Weapons but That's an
Improvement,
FORBES
(Nov.
9,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com
/sites/michaelgoldstein/2017/11/09/tsa-misses-70-of-fake-weapons-but-thats-an-improvement
/#395ab2372a38 [https://penna.cc/B9EF-7DZS]; Eric Bradner & Rene Marsh, Acting TSA
DirectorReassignedAfter ScreenersFailedTests to Detect Explosives, Weapons, CNN (June 2,

2015),
https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/01/politics/tsa-failed-undercover-airport-screeningtests/index.html [https://penna.cc/4KY9-JT8Y].
382. NELLIE BLY, TEN DAYS IN A MAD-HOUSE 3 (1887).
383. See Pete Grieve, 40 Years Later, Reporters Remember How They Bought a Bar to

Expose Corruption,CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 26, 2018, at 3.

Published by Scholar Commons,

61

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 2 [], Art. 10
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

584

[VOL. 71: 523

bribes to overlook code violations. 384 The movie Fast Times at Ridgemont

High was based on Cameron Crowe's book of the same name, 385 which
depicted the twenty-two-year-old author's year-long undercover experience
as a high school senior. 386
In 1992, two TV reporters for ABC's PrimeTime Live news magazine

show went undercover at the supermarket chain Food Lion in order to
document alleged unsanitary food handling practices. 387 The reporters
successfully applied for jobs with Food Lion stores in North Carolina and
South Carolina, using made-up identities, fake resumes, and false references
to conceal their true identities as ABC employees. 388 Then, at their "new"
jobs, the reporters secretly filmed what appeared to be stomach-turning foodhandling practices: "Food Lion employees repackaging and redating fish that

had passed the expiration date, grinding expired beef with fresh beef, and
applying barbeque sauce to chicken past its expiration date in order to mask
the smell and sell it as fresh in the gourmet food section." 389
Another example of journalistic sting operations was the Dateline NBC
program "To Catch a Predator," which aired from late 2004 to late 2007.390 In

this show, members of a group known as Perverted-Justice pretended to be
teenage girls under the age of consent and would frequent online chat rooms,
eventually attracting the attention of purported sex predators. 391 Some chats
would turn explicitly sexual, and if the sting target proposed a physical
encounter, the Perverted-Justice member would name a location. 392 Waiting
at that location would be a young-looking actress playing a decoy, who would
invite the target inside the home. 393 Typically, she would tell the target to relax
while she would go to change; at that point, host Chris Hansen would step out
to confront the target with printed transcripts of the sexually explicit chat
conversation. 394 For the target, the situation would only get worse from there

384. Id.
385. See generally CAMERON CROWE, FAST TIMES AT RIDGEMONT HIGH: A TRUE STORY

(1981).
386. Id. at 9.
387. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities, 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999).
388. Id. at 510.
389. Id. at 510-11.
390. Maurice Chammah, The Return of 'To Catch a Predator,'MARSHALL PROJECT (Jan.
22, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/01/22/the-return-of-to-catch-a-predator
[https://penna.cc/4KAY-L5BV].
391. Luke Dittrich, Tonight on Dateline This Man Will Die, ESQUIRE, Sept. 1, 2007, at
233, 235.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
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because the police would be waiting outside to arrest him whenever he tried
to leave. 395
The mere fact that a particular undercover operation turned out to be
successful from the standpoint of achieving the intended goal-such as
delivering a shocking expose to the readership-has not always resulted in
unqualified accolades. The Chicago Sun-Times' series based on its secret
ownership and operation of the Mirage tavern (documenting the astounding

level of corruption and graft among Chicago inspectors) won the Pulitzer
Prize jury's vote, but the Pulitzer board, led by Washington Post editor Ben
Bradlee, overrode that vote, believing that the newspaper had entrapped the
city officials, acted deceptively, or both. 396
Similarly, the PrimeTime Live segment on Food Lion embroiled ABC in

protracted litigation over the news program's use of deception to secure the
undercover positions for the two reporters.3 97 The jury returned a verdict in
favor of Food Lion on its counts of fraud, trespass, and breach of the duty of
loyalty, and based on the jury's special findings, the district court found in
favor of Food Lion on its contention that ABC had engaged in unfair business
practices in violation of state law. 398 Food Lion was awarded $1 on its breach
of duty of loyalty claim, $1 on its trespass claim, $1,400 in compensatory
damages, and over $5 million in punitive damages on the fraud claim. 399 (The
court reduced the punitive damages award to $315,000.) After the trial, the
jury foreman reportedly told ABC: "You did not have guidelines before ....
You now have them. Let's find a way to work within those guidelines."400
And, despite its seemingly laudatory goal of identifying child sex
predators and helping law enforcement prosecute them, MSNBC's "To Catch
a Predator" program drew criticism on a variety of fronts, including charges
that the show over sensationalized the issues, 40 1 entrapped the alleged

395. Id.
396. See

PRIZES,

Chicago

Tribune

Goes

Undercover for

Stunning

Expose,

PULITZER

https://www.pulitzer.org/article/chicago-tribune-goes-undercover-stunning-expose

[https://penna.cc/36WV-DWQ7].
397. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities, 194 F.3d 505, 511 (4th Cir. 1999).
398. Id.
399. Id. The court had also awarded $1,500 on the unfair business practices claim but
forced Food Lion to choose between that and the fraud claim. Id.
400. Susan Paterno, The Lying Game, AM. JOURNALISM REV., May 1997, at 40.
401. See Dittrich, supra note 391, at 241; Craig Silverman, Gotcha/ Dateline'sPredator
Problem and the Lobotomy that Caused It, HUFFPOST: THE BLOG (June 12, 2006),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/gotcha-datelines-predator_b_22840
[ttps://perma.cc/62GAKMP5]; Ethics ofNBC's Sting Show 'To Catch a Predator,'NPR (Jan. 16, 2007, 10:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=6870926
[https://perma.cc
/KE6B-Q4QP].
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predators, arrogated to itself the right to punish perpetrators by exposing them
to public humiliation without the benefit of trial, and essentially bought stories
by paying Perverted-Justice for its role. 40 2 In one notable instance, a district
attorney refused to prosecute any of the targets of a "To Catch a Predator"
operation out of evidentiary concerns over the authenticity of the chat logs. 403
We should be hesitant to draw any definitive conclusions based on the
reactions to these disparate incidents, as they span several years and different
contexts. Nevertheless, it appears that the degree and type of interaction
between the undercover operative and the target is correlated with the general
response to that undercover operation. Where the undercover operation
consists primarily of concealing one's identity but otherwise interacting with
the target in much the same way as any other member of the public, there has
been little, if any, controversy over the operation. 404 Restaurant reviewers,
housing testers, and TSA agents checking whether DHS screeners will notice
forbidden items exercise very little discretion in terms of how they interact
with those whom they are testing. The DHS agent does not influence how the
TSA scanner performs his or her duties, but rather merely observes the
competency of that performance. 405 Indeed, but for the fact that one might risk

being detained or arrested for attempting to sneak a weapon on board a flight,
an ordinary traveler could perform the same test. In the same way, the
restaurant reviewer has no effect on the kitchen staff's food preparation and
presumably little, if any, effect on the wait staff.406 Undercover journalist
Nellie Bly's instructions from her editor describe passive, rather than active,
engagement with the subject of the story:

402. See, e.g., Douglas McCollam, The Shame Game, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.Feb. 2007, at 31, https://archives.cjr.org/feature/theshamegame.php [https://penna.cc/EC4D5624]; Brian Montopoli, Does "Dateline"Go Too Far "To Catch a Predator?,"CBS NEWS
(Feb. 7, 2006, 11:20 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/does-dateline-go-too-far-to-catch-apredator/ [https://penna.cc/KE6B-Q4QP].
403. See Associated Press, Texas DA Won't Prosecute Any Pedophiles Nabbed in NBC
"Predator"Show, Fox NEWS (June 28, 2007), https://www.foxnews.com/story/texas-da-wontprosecute-any-pedophiles-nabbed-in-nbc-predator-show [https://perma.cc/6YWM-BTPT]. An
additional complicating factor was that one of the targets was a prosecutor from another district
who committed suicide when facing arrest. Id.
404. See, e.g., Jack Shafer, Is it Ever OKforJournaliststo Lie?, POLITICO MAG. (Nov. 30,
2017),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/11/30/fourth-estate-project-veritasjames-okeefe-215991 [https://perma.cc/DE5Y-DCU2].
405. Goldstein, supra note 381.
406. Of course, a reviewer who was so inclined could go out of his or her way to treat the
wait staff unusually well or unusually poorly in an attempt to affect the service provided. But it
is difficult to see why a reviewer would do so; any reviewer who was so unscrupulous could
simply write a false review. Goldstein, supra note 381.
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I was to chronicle faithfully the experiences I underwent, and when
once within the walls of the asylum to find out and describe its inside
workings, which are always, so effectually hidden by white-capped
nurses, as well as by bolts and bars, from the knowledge of the public.
"We do not ask you to go there for the purpose of making sensational
revelations. Write up things as you find them, good or bad; give
praise or blame as you think best, and the truth all the time."40 7

In other words, these sorts of undercover operations are the functional
equivalent of passive observation. They are also the equivalent of the sort of
law enforcement "[a]rtifice and stratagem" that the Supreme Court has
explicitly condoned as "merely afford[ing] opportunities or facilities for the
commission of the offense .... "408 On the other hand, some of the more
controversial incidents and programs involve undercover operatives who
crossed beyond mere observation into direct influence, if not manipulation, of
those they were targeting. The ABC news reporters in the FoodLion case did
not just use their deceptively obtained jobs to record what they (but not the
general public) were in a position to see; there was evidence, preserved in
outtake footage but not aired, showing that "the undercover ABC producers
performed much of the food handling mischief captured by their concealed
cameras" and that "ABC producers tried to lure Food Lion workers into
violating company rules on the handling of food." 409
B.

Stings as Mimicry

Because undercover sting operations in the counterterrorism context

typically involve a degree of interaction between the undercover operative and
the target, 410 they will rarely constitute passive surveillance. As a form of
active detection, a sting operation is aimed at ascertaining whether the target
indeed harbors any terrorist intentions-currentor latent.41 For the purposes

of this analysis, a target who has current intentions to engage in terrorism

407. BLY, supra note 382, at 2.
408. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932) (citing Price v. United States,
165 U.S. 311, 315 (1897)); Rosenv. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 42 (1896); Andrews v. United
States, 162 U.S. 420, 423 (1896); Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 610 (1895); Goode v.
United States, 159 U.S. 663, 669 (1895); United States v. Reisenweber, 288 F. 520, 526 (2d Cir.
1923); Aultman v. United States, 289 F. 251, 252 (5th Cir. 1923); Bates v. United States, 10 F.
92, 97 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1881)).
409. JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, ABC's FOOD LION LIES: A STUDY IN TV DECEPTION (1997).

410. See supra notes 334-44 and accompanying text.
411. Id.
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would be someone who would attempt an act of terrorism notwithstanding
any intervention by the undercover operatives. A target with latent intentions,
on the other hand, would be someone who would likely not engage in any
terrorism absent external persuasion.
When conceived as a traditional law enforcement operation, the sting
operation is tempered by the need to avoid entrapment. If we use terminology
from the entrapment defense, the target with latent intentions is not
predisposed to engage in terrorism. In Jacobson v. United States, the

government spent two years targeting the defendant with various child
pornography catalogs and other material before he agreed to place an order.4 12
The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, noting that "although he had
become predisposed to break the law by May 1987, it is our view that the
Government did not prove that this predisposition was independent, and not
the product of the attention that the Government had directed at
petitioner ... ."413 In other words, that the sting operation resulted in the
target's attempt to commit a crime is not by itself sufficient to defeat a claim
of entrapment because the attempt demonstrates only that the defendant was
predisposed to commit the crime at that instant and not necessarily that the
defendant was predisposed to commit the crime before the undercover
operatives began interacting with him or her. 414
Whether the government should be required to prove predisposition in
domestic terrorism sting cases when entrapment is raised as a defense is an
interesting question. A target with only latent intentions who is susceptible to
manipulation by undercover government operatives is presumably susceptible
to similar manipulation by terrorist recruiters. If such recruiters actually
exist, 4i 5 then whether the target will be induced into attempting an act of
terrorism will turn on whether the sting operation finds the target before a
recruiter would have (if at all).
There is, to be sure, a The Minority Report-like aspect to this argument.
In the Philip K. Dick novella (and subsequent movie based on the story), a
future society controlled crime by arresting suspects before they even
attempted their crimes, based on the predictions of psychics who could see the
future. 4 6 The philosophical question raised by the story is whether society is

justified in punishing people before they have committed crimes if there is

412.
413.
414.
415.

503 U.S. 540, 540 (1992).
Id. at 550.
See id.
See supra notes 352-61 and accompanying text.

416. See PHILIP K. DICK, The Minority Report, in 4 THE COMPLETE STORIES OF PHILIP

K.

DICK, at 71, 91-92 (2013); MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002).
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enough reason to believe that they will commit those crimes in the future. 417
This is a question that is beyond the scope of this Article as it is primarily a
policy issue, and it is worth noting that, at least in regards to counterterrorism,
the United States has embraced preventative policing. 418 John Ashcroft,
President George W. Bush's first Attorney General, stated in a speech in
support of the USA PATRIOT Act:
It falls to the men and women of justice and law enforcement to
engage terrorism at home. History's judgment will be harsh-and the
people's judgment will be sure-if we fail to use every available
resource to prevent future terrorist attacks.

. Our single objective is to prevent terrorist attacks by taking
..
suspected terrorists off the street. 419
Ashcroft referenced the Kennedy Administration's aggressive law
enforcement tactics against organized crime, often relying on pretextual
0
prosecutions "to get the job done." 42
Even if one accepts the philosophy of preventative policing (i.e., the
importance of stopping certain crimes from occurring, rather than identifying
and prosecuting the perpetrators afterward), the assumption is that the
government has correctly assessed the future. In The Minority Report, the

team of psychics splits on whether the protagonist will commit the predicted
murder, calling into question whether the system of convicting defendants for
crimes that they have not yet committed is justified. 421 Similarly, even if one
accepts the theoretical legitimacy of counterterrorism sting operations on the
ground that they can identify and stop would-be perpetrators of mass casualty
attacks, that legitimacy is also grounded on the assumption that the sting
operation has correctly identified such a target.
If the target is someone with current intentions to commit an act of
terrorism, and the undercover operatives are seemingly to facilitate the attack,
then it seems unlikely that the sting operation has inaccurately identified the

417. DICK, supra note 416, at 92-93.
418. See Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks for the US Mayors Conference,
(Oct. 25, 2001) https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarksl0_25.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZZJ4-JWQW].
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. DICK, supra note 416, at 120-21.

Published by Scholar Commons,

67

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 2 [], Art. 10
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

590

[VOL. 71: 523

person as a would-be terrorist. For the person who is predisposed to commit
an act of terrorism, the sting operation simply reveals that predisposition.
However, if the sting operation manipulates the target into attempting the

act of terrorism, the government's justification for such manipulation must be
that in the absence of the sting operation, the target would likely have been
manipulated by actual terrorist recruiters at some point in the future. Under
this justification, the government is effectively acting as a "market
participant" in competition with terrorists to find and mobilize potential
recruits.4 22 The market participant justification in turn depends critically on
two assumptions: (1) the undercover operatives were mimicking terrorist

recruiters; and (2) there existed some non-trivial possibility that the target and
actual terrorist recruiters would have made contact had the government agents
not reached the target first.
C.

Mimicking TerroristRecruiters

The information operations analogy to counterterrorism suggests that

counterterrorism operations can be used to detect and identify targets, and to
confuse and deceive those targets. Thus, the first assumption underlying the
validity of the market participant justification is that the government
operatives were mimicking terrorist recruiters. In other words, the sting

operation must be a substitute for actual terrorism recruiting in terms of types
of plots, method of recruitment, resources and support provided, and
manipulation.

From the standpoint of detecting and identifying targets at risk of being
manipulated and mobilized by actual terrorist recruiters, an ideal
counterterrorism operation will be practically indistinguishable from the real
deal because a positive response (i.e., agreement to carry out the plot)
demonstrates that, under those circumstances, the target could become a
terrorist. Preventative policing would then call for incapacitating that
person.423 However, the more that the counterterrorism operation deviates
from the practices of actual terrorist recruiters, the less confident we can be
that the target is, so to speak, shopping in the correct market. As an easy
example, suppose government operatives successfully manipulate a target by

threatening the target with prosecution unless he agrees to engage in an act of
terrorism; the target would be shown to be susceptible to pressure based on
legal punishment. However, such an operation would utterly fail at showing

422. See Roth, supra note 354, at 982.
423. MARK H. MOORE, ET AL., NAT'L INST. JUSTICE, CRIME AND POLICING 4 (1988).
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that the target could have been manipulated by terrorists because terrorists
would lack the ability to threaten anyone with prosecution.
To be sure, this example is extreme in its starkness, and in practice,
whether an undercover sting operation is sufficiently indistinguishable from
actual terrorism recruiting may present challenges on the margins. Since the
early 1990s, major terroristic acts (successful or not) have involved truck
bombings of buildings, mass shootings, or attacks on aircraft.424 In 2011, as a
result of an undercover sting operation, Rezwan Ferdaus was charged with
attempting to bomb the Pentagon and the U.S. Capitol with remote controlled
planes packed with explosives. 425 There has not been a publicly known prior
terrorism attempt involving remote controlled planes or drone aircraft, so one
might ask whether the sting operation was an adequate substitute for actual
terrorism recruiting at the time. Perhaps it is enough to say that the precise
delivery mechanism of explosives (truck bomb parked at the target location
versus remote controlled plane) is not as important as the broad goal of the
attack (mass casualties and destruction of a public building).
Or consider the 2010 sting operation against Mohamed Mohamud, in

which undercover operatives pretended to be connected to the terrorists that
Mohamud was trying to contact. 426 The government claimed (and the jury
accepted) that Mohamud originated the idea of parking a truck bomb near a
light rail station on the evening of Portland's annual Christmas Tree lighting
ceremony; 427 however, Mohamud had no resources of his own with which to
carry out the plot and did not know how to build such an explosive device. 428
The undercover agents provided Mohamud with cash to buy bomb-making
materials and to rent a safe house, and then they provided him with the
purported bomb. 429 It seems safe to conclude that Mohamud would not have
been able to realize his plot to bomb the tree lighting ceremony on his own.
Thus, the relevant question is whether terrorist recruiters provide cash and
build bombs for their recruits or other substantially equivalent material
assistance.

When it comes to method of recruitment, one immediate difference is that
between the target who reaches out and seeks contact with terrorists versus

424. See, e.g., US TerroristAttacksFastFacts, CNN (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.cnn.com
/2013/04/18/us/u-s-terrorist-attacks-fast-facts/index.html [https://penna.cc/2TBA-C96K].
425. See Jess Bidgood, MassachusettsMan Gets 17 Years in TerroristPlot, N.Y. TIMES,

Nov. 2, 2012, at A17.
426. United States. v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 425 (9th Cir. 2016).
427. Id. at 427.
428. See id. at 428.
429. Id. at 428-29.
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the one who waits passively until being found by others. Again, there may be
a spectrum rather than a binary distinction; a target may draw attention to
himself through public social media postings without actually seeking anyone
directly and then be contacted by like-minded persons. 43 0

D. Actual Possibility ofRecruitment
Even if the undercover operation mimicked the tactics of actual terrorist
recruiters, the government should show some nontrivial possibility that the
target of the sting would have connected with such actual terrorist recruiters.
Otherwise, the government is prosecuting a person based on a potentiality that
probably would never have occurred. It would be same as if, in the fictional
world of The Minority Report, the psychics made an incorrect prediction that
nevertheless led to the arrest and conviction of a suspect.
Whether the defendant who was caught in terrorism sting operation would
likely have connected with actual terrorist recruiters depends on an
assessment of how long the defendant would have remained interested in
terrorism, how persistent the defendant was about trying to contact terrorist
recruiters, and how active terrorist recruiters were in the defendant's physical
geographic location and social media circles. These are relevant factors
because a prediction that the defendant would likely have connected with
terrorists is essentially a stochastic inquiry: in any given time unit, there is

some minute chance that the defendant would have made contact with (or been
contacted by) actual terrorists. The longer the period of the defendant's
interest in terrorism, the more such time units exist, and hence more chances
to connect.

'

Of course, predicting the likelihood of future events where human beings
are involved is unlike an exercise in classical physics, where, with perfect
information, one can predict the future movement of all physical bodies. 43
Still, courts do have experience with trying to determine, in some
circumstances, what would have happened had particular law enforcement
agents not gotten involved. The prime example is the inevitable discovery
doctrine, under which evidence obtained through an illegal search will not be

430. Note that Mohamed Mohamud wrote articles for the al Qaeda-connected online
magazine JihadRecollections. Id. at 423.
431. In the realm of Newtonian physics (i.e., classical mechanics), if one could know the
position and momentum of every particle in the universe, that person could calculate perfectly
where each particle has been in the past and where it will be in the future. See generally PIERRE

SION,

MARQUIS DE LAPLACE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON PROBABILITIES (Dover Publ'ns

ed. 1995) (1814).
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excluded from the prosecution's case in chief if the prosecution can establish
that other law enforcement agents would have found the same evidence
without any reliance on the illegal search. 43 2 In Nix v. Williams, the case
establishing the doctrine, two police detectives were transporting a prisoner
suspected of murdering a little girl whose body had not been found. 433 During
the drive, the detectives spoke directly to the prisoner, exploiting his empathy
and religious background to induce him to take them to the location of the
body.4 34 Because the suspect was already represented by counsel, the
detectives were prohibited from eliciting incriminating statements in the
absence of the defense lawyer. 435 Thus, the defendant's statements directing
the detectives to the victim's body, as well as the body itself (as fruit of the
poisonous tree), should have been subject to suppression due to the violation
of the his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 436 The trial court, however,
noted that there were multiple police teams searching for the girl's body and
concluded that one of those teams, being only 2.5 miles away, would have
found the body had the search not been mooted by the suspect's
cooperation. 43 7

Application of the inevitable discovery doctrine therefore requires that a
court construct the counterfactual world in which the police did not violate
the defendant's rights. 438 The key language from the opinion is that the police
"would have" discovered the evidence through lawful means. 43 9 In a footnote
to the majority opinion, the Court explained that "inevitable discovery
involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts
capable of ready verification or impeachment. ."440
In the case, the
historical facts consisted of the location of the search parties at the time the
defendant agreed to tell his escorts where the body was, the instructions the
search teams had been given about where to search, and the intended future
direction of the search.44' According to the Court, it was "clear that the search

432. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
433. Id. at 435.
434. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 392-93 (1977). The detective delivered what
has come to be known as the Christian Burial speech, in which he implored the prisoner to take
them to the little girl's body before the anticipated snowstorm might prevent it from ever being
discovered, and thus preventing the parents from giving her a proper Christian burial.
435. Nix, 467 U.S. at 435-38.
436. Id. at 437-38.
437. See id. at 448-50.
438. See id. at 437-38.
439. Id. at 444.
440. Id. at 444 n.5.
441. Id. at 448-49.
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parties were approaching the actual location of the body" and would have
discovered it on their own.442
That determination, however, contains a number of assumptions. A
prosecution witness testified that it would have taken the closest search party
three to five more hours to reach the body, and that the body was in a culvert,
which was one of the types of locations that the search parties had been
instructed to look in. 443 It seems likely that the search party would have
continued on, but there is no way of knowing for certain that (1) the searchers
would have spent up to five more hours before giving up; and (2) they would
have continued in that direction without veering away. 444 Nix held that the
prosecution needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
police would inevitably have discovered the evidence. 445
At one level, this may sound like a strange proposition. The government's
burden is to persuade the judge that it is more likely than not (i.e.,
preponderance of the evidence) that the police would certainly have found the
evidence in the absence of the unlawful search or seizure. Is that burden
materially different from having to persuade the judge that it is certain that the
police more likely than not would have found the evidence in the absence of
the unlawful search or seizure? Law is not mathematics, but this is an instance
where the associative property would seem to apply: a greater than 50%

chance (preponderance of the evidence) multiplied by a 100% certainty
(inevitable discovery) is functionally the same as a 100% certainty (absolute
proof) multiplied by a greater than 50% chance (likely discovery). Legal
standards are neither addition nor multiplication, so the associative property
is only an analogy; however, the point is that if the government makes a strong
case that the police would have found the evidence, but the judge still has
some doubt, can the judge meaningfully allocate that doubt specifically to the
burden of proof; or to the inevitability of discovery?
Yet, in practice, courts have been able to apply the inevitable discovery
doctrine. 446 The inevitable discovery doctrine is not the only instance in which
a trial court must construct a counterfactual world. When the police commit
an illegal search or seizure, the exclusionary rule calls for exclusion of not just
the direct evidence obtained as a result of the illegal action, but also certain

442. Id. at 449.
443. Id.
444. See RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 740 (4th

ed. 2016) ("How long would the search have gone on? What directions would it have moved?
How far?").
445. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 449.
446. E.g., United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (1st Cir. 1986).
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derivative evidence that the police would not have discovered elsewhere or
47
later.?
Derivative evidence will not be suppressed, however, if the
connection between the illegal police action and that evidence has been
"attenuated." 448 A prime example of attenuation is UnitedStates v. Ceccolini,

in which the defendant sought to suppress the testimony of a key government
witness on the grounds that the FBI agent had come to know of her existence
only because of a previous illegal search by a police officer. 449 The Court held
instead that the connection between the illegal search and the witness's
testimony had been attenuated by the witness's "free will": "Witnesses are not
like guns or documents which remain hidden from view until one turns over

a sofa or opens a filing cabinet. Witnesses can, and often do, come forward
and offer evidence entirely of their own volition." 45 0 Of relevance in this case
was the fact that the witness was, at the time, studying police science and had
indicated a willingness to help the FBI agent. 45' Thus, the Court concluded
that it was likely that the witness would have ended up helping the FBI on her
own, even if the FBI had not known to approach her-a plausible conclusion,
but one that necessarily involved a degree of speculation. 45 2
Courts have been able to reach the opposite conclusion when warranted.
In United States v. Ghailani, the defendant in a terrorism case successfully

moved to suppress a key prosecution witness on the ground that the
government learned of this witness through its coercive interrogation of the
defendant. 453 In rejecting the prosecution's argument that the effects of the
illegal interrogation had been attenuated, the district judge found that the
witness was not a "willing" one, and that his "motive in testifying is purely to
avoid prosecution and other feared adverse consequences to himself." 454
The inevitable discovery and attenuation of fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrines thus demonstrate that trial judges can, when presented with adequate
evidence, make determinations about the likelihood that a defendant would
have made contact with an actual terrorist had the government not caught him
in a sting operation.

447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.

See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
Id. at 487 (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
435 U.S. 268, 270 (1978).
Id. at 276-77.
Id. at 272.
See id. at 272, 280.
743 F. Supp. 2d 261, 265, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Id. at 281.
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CourtHearings

If a domestic terrorism defendant raises the issues of whether the sting
operation mimicked actual terrorism recruiting and whether there was a
reasonable possibility of contact between recruiter and target, the trial court
must resolve the matter. But resolution could be left to the jury as the trial
factfinder, or to the judge; and if the latter, the presentation of evidence to
support the prosecution's position could be adversarial or ex parte.
1.

Judge or Jury?

A criminal defendant is entitled to trial by jury if the maximum sentence
that could be imposed for conviction is more than six months, meaning that
the ultimate issue of guilt is decided by a jury. 455 There are, however, many
subissues that are potentially decided by the judge during pretrial hearings,
and some of those may end the case. 456 A successful motion to dismiss the
indictment due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, for example,
results in a court order barring any reindictment of the defendant for the same
alleged conduct. 457 Theoretically, government conduct might become rise to
a level of outrageousness so as to warrant dismissal of an indictment with
prejudice. 458
When the defense raises entrapment, the burden shifts to the prosecution
to prove either that law enforcement agents did not induce the defendant to
commit the crime in question or that the defendant was predisposed to commit
the crime even before interaction with the law enforcement agents. 459 Notably,
predisposition to commit the crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
to the jury. 460 Predisposition is essentially the flip side of mens rea. If the

government agents induced the defendant to commit the crime, and the

455. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (citing Cheff v. Schnackenberg,
384 U.S. 373 (1966)).
456. See FED. R. CRI. P. 14.
457. See 18 U.S.C. §3288 (2018).
458. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) ("[W]e may some day be
presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that
due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to
obtain a conviction.").
459. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1992) (citing United States v.
Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481, 1483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). The predisposition requirement is part of the
subjective version of the entrapment doctrine and is used in federal courts as well as a majority
of the states. See MARCUS, supra note 348, at 669-706.
460. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 551 n.3.
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defendant was not already predisposed to do so, then the defendant did not
really have the requisite mens rea to be guilty. Therefore, it makes sense that
entrapment (at least, the subjective version) is a jury issue. Accordingly, it
might seem that whether a sting operation adequately mimicked actual
terrorism recruiting and whether there was a reasonable possibility that the
defendant would have connected with those recruiters should also be matters
for the jury to decide.
In fact, that inquiry bears strong resemblance to the objective version of
entrapment, which focuses on the government's conduct and is used by a
minority of states. 46 1As it turns out, of the states that use the objective version
of entrapment, some treat it as a jury issue, while others leave it to the judge
to decide. 462 The argument for having the judge decide the issue is that the
objective version of entrapment focuses on law enforcement misconduct, and
"[j]udges are thought to be better able to decide issues involving deterrence
of governmental overreaching and establishing standards for future police
conduct." 463 Under the same reasoning, the degree of mimicry and the
possibility of actual contact with terrorists are matters that are best left to the
judge. The focus of the inquiry is on the conduct of the sting operation, not
the defendant's mental state.
Even more of a reason to treat the inquiry as one for the judge to determine
is that it can be resolved in pretrial hearing, similar to, say, a suppression
hearing. The majority of criminal defendants plead guilty, 464 so a jury-based
defense (such as the subjective version of entrapment) has very little practical
impact. If the adequacy of the government's mimicry of actual terrorism
recruiting is a pretrial matter for the judge to determine, however, the
defendant can litigate the issue and, if unsuccessful, can resolve the case
through a plea negotiation, thus avoiding the dilemma of choosing only one
at the expense of the other. Furthermore, the terrorism sting defendant who
challenges the sting operation unsuccessfully could plead guilty conditionally
with the permission of the prosecution and the court, and thus be able to appeal
the adverse ruling. 465

461. See MARCUS, supra note 348, at 43.
462. Id. at 184.
463. Id. at 185.
464. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 444, at 1231-32 (noting that about 64% of those
charged with felonies in the seventy-five largest counties pleaded guilty, while only 3% went to
trial, with the rest having charges dismissed or resolved non-adjudicatively; and that when
looking at those who were convicted, 97% pleaded guilty).
465. See FED. R. CRI. P. 11(a)(2).
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Adversarialor Ex ParteProceeding?

Most hearings before judges in criminal cases involve both the defense
and the government present. 466 In fact, upon "the start of adversary judicial

proceedings," 467 the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches,
and it is an infringement of that right if the defendant is denied counsel at any
critical stage.468
There are, to be sure, instances where criminal matters proceed ex parte,
notably when law enforcement officers apply for search or arrest warrants, or
wiretap orders, as well as grand jury proceedings. These applications typically

take place during the investigative stage, before the start of formal adversarial
judicial proceedings, when the right to counsel has not yet attached. 469 More
importantly, these proceedings generally require secrecy in the moment,

which could not be accomplished in an adversarial hearing. 470 The target of a
search warrant who has advanced warning about a potential forthcoming
search may be able to conceal or destroy evidence, while a person who learns
about the existence of a wiretap may use other telephones to avoid
surveillance. 47 1
Those considerations do not apply to a defendant who seeks to litigate the
degree that a terrorism sting operation mimicked actual recruiting efforts and
the possibility that the defendant would have made contact with actual
terrorists. While the government may well wish to keep the details of the
operation from the public and from terrorists, the defendant is necessarily
aware (now) of the sting operation tactics used against him. Thus, secrecy in
the moment is not a justification for permitting the government to defend the
mimicry of the sting operation ex parte. Moreover, even when the government

proceeds ex parte to obtain search warrants, wiretaps, or grand jury
indictments, the defendant subsequently is entitled to challenge the underlying
legal and factual determinations in an adversarial proceeding; the defendant
can, for example, try to suppress evidence gathered during the execution of a

466. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008).
467. Id. at 209.
468. Id. at 212.
469. See id. at 208-09.
470. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 602 (1995).
471. Id. at 596 (discussing defendant's disclosure of wiretap of target to defendant's
nephew -a friend of the target with the implication that the nephew was to warn the target).
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search warrant by challenging the probable cause alleged in the supporting
affidavit. 472

Still, the government does have a plausible claim that it needs to keep the
scope of its knowledge about terrorist recruiting tactics from the public-and
in particular, other terrorists distinct from the defendant. Too much public
disclosure of what the government knows about terrorism recruiting tactics
could lead terrorists to alter their recruiting tactics so as to avoid being
mimicked by undercover operatives. Moreover, such disclosure could also
reveal the sources and methods by which the government obtained the
information, and thereby enable terrorists to evade surveillance or other
intelligence gathering. 473

The defense lawyer has a duty and obligation to provide the client a
zealous defense, 474 which in this context could mean mounting a vigorous
challenge to the sting operation. It would be difficult, on the other hand, to see
how a defense lawyer would be representing the client legitimately by
indiscriminately disclosing classified information to the public or, more
instrumentally, agreeing not to disclose classified information in exchange for
favorable plea-bargaining terms.
Although not exactly the same situation, the federal conviction of Lynne
Stewart provides an example of a defense lawyer gone wrong in the
representation of a terrorism client. 475 Stewart was a famous criminal defense
lawyer known "for representing the poor and the reviled, usually for modest,
court-paid fees," and who "sympathized with clients who sought to fight that
system, even with violence, although she did not always endorse their tactics,
she said." 476 Stewart's client, Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman, also known
as the Blind Sheikh, was one of the leaders of the foreign terrorist organization
Islamic Group, as well as a key conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center
truck bomb attack. 477 Upon his conviction, the Bureau of Prisons imposed

472. Granted, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule will result in the admission
of such evidence even if the trial court finds a lack of probable cause unless that lack of probable
cause was plainly obvious to the police officers. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 904
(1984).
473. A well-known example is how al Qaeda founder and leader Osama bin Laden stopped
using a satellite phone after a newspaper reported in 1998 that the National Security Agency was
following his movements based on the phone. See David E. Rosenbaum, Bush Account of a
Leak's Has Support, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at A24.
474. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT,

pmbl. (AM. BAR

ASS'N 2018).

475. See Joseph P. Fried, Lynne Stewart Dies at 77; Leftist Lawyer Convicted of Aiding
Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2017, at B16.
476. Id.
477. See United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2009).
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Special Administrative Measures on Abdel Rahman to limit his contact with
the outside world; Stewart signed a form agreeing that she would bring a
translator for the sole purpose of communicating legal matters with Abdel
Rahman, and that she would not use meetings with Abdel Rahman to pass
messages to and from third parties. 478 Nevertheless, Stewart was convicted of
providing material assistance to a foreign terrorist organization by allowing

members of the Islamic Group to communicate with Abdel Rahman through
messages smuggled by Stewart and her translator, as well as smuggling out a
message from Abdel Rahman to the public. 479 While Stewart had defenders
who believed that she had been prosecuted unfairly to chill zealous
representation
of
terrorism
defendants,
"[m]any
mainstream
lawyers . . believed that Ms. Stewart had acted criminally," 480 and the
Second Circuit not only upheld her conviction but also reversed the district
court's original sentence of twenty-eight months on the ground that the judge
failed to consider a terrorism sentencing enhancement; on remand, the district
court imposed the ten-year sentence that the appeals court had strongly
suggested was appropriate. 48 1

National security concerns in other criminal contexts have given rise to
solutions that could ameliorate the problem identified here. Federal courts
have upheld conditioning a defense lawyer's access to classified information
about actual terrorist recruiting practices only where that lawyer has been
granted security clearance. 48 2 Security clearance is, of course, not an absolute
guarantee that the recipient will not disclose the classified material, as recent
high-profile, security-cleared leakers Reality Winner, Edward Snowden, and
Chelsea Manning have demonstrated. 483 But a security clearance requirement
to be able to access classified information should reduce the likelihood of both
inadvertent as well as intentional disclosures.

478. Id. at 102-03.
479. Id. at 107-08.
480. See Fried, supra note 475, atB16.
481. See id.
482. See, e.g., United States v. Bin Laden, 58 F. Supp. 2d 113, 122-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(rejecting defense counsel's claim that court could not require security clearance to be able to
access classified information); United States v. Al-Arian, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1267 (M.D. Fla.
2003); United States v. Al-Arian, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1267 (M.D. Fla. 2003); United States
v. Abdi, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1087-88 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
483. See, e.g., Ken Dilanian, How Did Accused NSA Leaker Reality Winner Get Security
Clearance?, NBC NEWS (June 6, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/how-did[https://penna.cc/5H93accused-nsa-leaker-reality-winner-get-security-clearance-n768816
P3HS].
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A requirement of security clearance for defense counsel does raise
concerns that the Justice Department-which issues such clearances-will
have "the ability to control who will work on classified matters for the
defense. To eliminate a particularly troublesome opponent, the Justice
Department may deny a security clearance to a specific attorney, investigator,
or expert witness . . . who needs access to classified information to be

effective." 484 Federal courts have not, however, been receptive to defense
arguments against security clearance requirements. 485

The alternative would be to deny the defense access to any classified
information about terrorism recruiting tactics. The defense would remain free
to argue that the sting operation did not mimic actual terrorism recruiting, but
the defense would be hampered by being able to present only one piece of the
puzzle, that being the defendant's account of what was done to him. The other
piece of the puzzle is the recruiting practices of actual terrorists. At best,
defense counsel might be able to rely on open source materials to construct a
sense of how terrorists recruit, but such information is almost certainly going
to be incomplete.
VII. CONCLUSION

U.S. domestic counterterrorism policy, in the nearly two decades since
the September 11 attacks, has embraced a variety of tactics ranging from
widespread electronic surveillance to undercover sting operations. Civil
libertarians have decried these tactics as unlawful and unjustified, and in some
instances-such as mass warrantless surveillance-courts have reined in the
government. On the other hand, the undercover sting operations have resulted
in dozens of convictions notwithstanding claims of entrapment.
This Article has suggested a normative reconceptualization of domestic
counterterrorism as a form of information warfare aimed at detecting,
identifying,

confusing,

and

deceiving

potential

enemies.

Electronic

surveillance, public monitoring of social media, and following up on tips can
be analogized to radar, and sting operations can be analogized both to radar
(in detecting the enemy) and to deception operations (in deceiving the enemy).
Detecting the enemy in the context of counterterrorism is really an exercise in
determining the intentions of the target, as well as the susceptibility of the
target to manipulation and inducement by others. This exercise requires that
the government mimic the ways in which terrorism recruiters manipulate and

484. Brian Z. Tamanaha, A CriticalReview ofthe ClassifiedInformationProceduresAct,
13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277, 289 (1986).
485. See Al-Arian, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1267; Abdi, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 1087; United States
v. Oakley, No. 3:07-CR-88, 2007 WL 4118298, at *4-5 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 16, 2007).
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induce others into committing acts of terrorism. Although this is primarily a
factual inquiry, it is best decided by the judge, ratherthan the jury, and can be
resolved in pretrial litigation, which has the additional benefit of allowing
defendants to get a judicial resolution while still being able to enter plea
negotiations, as opposed to having to go to trial to raise the defense. Finally,

any concerns about disclosing classified information about terrorist recruiting
practices can be addressed by requiring security clearances for defense
counsel.
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